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KEEP OUT! THE EFFICACY OF TRESPASS, 
NUISANCE AND PRIVACY TORTS AS APPLIED 
TO DRONES 
Hillary B. Farber* 
INTRODUCTION 
A few years ago one might have seen a small object flying 
overhead without any idea what it could be. Today, it is fairly 
commonplace to see drones flying around our neighborhood skies. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts there will be 
seven million drones populating our skies by 2020. 1  In 2015 
hobbyists, recreational users, and commercial businesses purchased 
unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as drones, in record-
breaking numbers. 2  Estimates reveal that over 4.3 million drones 
were sold worldwide in 2015.3 Trade industry experts predicted that 
more than 2.8 million drones would be sold in the U.S. in 2016 and 
4.8 million in 2017.4 The surge in drone sales means more drones in 
the sky. The FAA estimates that by the end of this decade 30,000 
drones will occupy our skies.5 Drones are being used for commercial 
and recreational purposes. 6  Commercial users such as real estate 
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 1. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST 31 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 30. 
 3. Paul Bedard, Drone Sales Surge 167% to 4.3 Million, U.S. Leads but China Catching Up, 
WASH. EXAMINER (May 29, 2015, 12:31 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/drone-sales-surge-
167-to-4.3-million-u.s.-leads-but-china-catching-up/article/2565240. 
 4. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 1, at 31; Joshua Brustein, How Drones Are Adapting to New 
U.S. Rules, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Jan. 6, 2016, 2:36 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2016-01-06/how-drones-are-adapting-to-new-u-s-rules. At this year’s annual Consumer Electronic 
Show (CES), the biggest electronic show in the world, “CES organizers said the U.S. market reached 
$105 million in revenue last year, an increase of more than 50 percent from the year before.” Id. 
 5. Ben Sclair, 30,000 Drones by 2020, GEN. AVIATION NEWS (May 2, 2013), 
http://generalaviationnews.com/2013/05/02/30000-drones-by-2020/. 
 6. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Frequently Asked Questions/Help, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/faqs/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2016). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2852083 
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agents, videographers, farmers, and engineers are capitalizing on this 
relatively inexpensive technology to take aerial photographs, monitor 
crops, and inspect infrastructure.7 Hobbyists and recreational drone 
users fly drones for the sheer fun of it—deploying out-of-the-box 
drones to shoot the most authentic “selfies” and building drones for 
competitions.8 There are endless civil applications for drones, and the 
possibilities will continue to grow at even higher rates as the 
technology develops and becomes more accessible to the public. 
In response to this unprecedented growth, the FAA increased 
regulation and oversight of drone operation for not only commercial 
operators but recreational users, too. In December 2015, the FAA 
instituted a registration requirement for all recreational drone 
operators.9 The registration process is designed to make it easier for 
the FAA to keep track of and identify the thousands of drones 
populating our skies.10 On June 28, 2016, the FAA issued new rules 
for the operation of commercial drones weighing less than fifty-five 
pounds. 11  These new rules simplify the licensing process for 
commercial operators to fly unmanned aircraft at altitudes below four 
hundred feet.12 Until these new rules took effect, commercial users 
could not operate drones without a Certificate of Authorization 
(COA) from the FAA.13 On average, applicants waited four to six 
																																																																																																																																
 7. AMANDA ESSEX, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., TAKING OFF: STATE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
SYSTEMS (DRONES) POLICIES 5 (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/taking-off-state-
unmanned-aircraft-systems-policies.aspx; See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones 
Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 54 (2015) (“[F]irefighting and 
disaster recovery, precision agriculture and ranching, [and] pipeline and other utility inspection . . . .”). 
 8. Facial Recognition Drone Gives Your Selfie Stick Wings, UAV EXPERT NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016), 
http://www.uavexpertnews.com/facial-recognition-drone-gives-your-selfie-stick-wings/; Mike Murphy, 
The First US National Drone-Racing Competition Was Won by an Australian, QUARTZ (July 18, 2015), 
http://qz.com/457748/fpv-national-drone-racing-championship/. 
 9. Press Release, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA Announces Small UAS Registration Rule (Dec. 14, 
2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=19856. 
 10. See Cecilia Kang, Drone Shopping? F.A.A. Rules May Hover Over Holidays, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/technology/proposed-regulations-for-drones-are-
released.html. 
 11. See generally Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 
42,064 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, et al.). 
 12. See id. 
 13. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 333, 125 Stat. 11 (2012). 
Obtaining a COA from the FAA is a lengthy process whereby one must apply for an exemption under 
§ 333 of the 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act. Id. 
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months to obtain a COA from the FAA once they submitted all 
documents.14 The new rules eliminate the waiting period and much of 
the bureaucratic process. Now that the rules have been finalized, the 
volume of drones in our skies will increase exponentially. 
Drones are poised to bring endless commercial benefit to many 
industries. They are also fun recreational gadgets with more 
capabilities than their predecessors, remote-controlled helicopters. 
But along with the benefits of new technologies comes misuse. 
Concerns are mounting over drones snooping, spying, and crashing.15 
News stories abound with reports of people observing drones buzzing 
by their windows, hovering over their backyards, and invading their 
privacy at parks, beaches, and sporting events.16 In some instances, 
																																																																																																																																
 14. See Warren Rapp, New FAA Rules Say Drones Can Take to the Skies—with Restrictions, THE 
CONVERSATION (Feb. 20, 2015, 6:05 AM), http://theconversation.com/new-faa-rules-say-drones-can-
take-to-the-skies-with-restrictions-37782; Ron Smith, UAV Use Requires Training and Certification, 
SW. FARM PRESS (July 5, 2016), http://southwestfarmpress.com/cotton/uav-use-requires-training-and-
certification. Not only is time a factor under the current rules, but the FAA is the sole authority to 
determine how many exemptions to issue, to whom, and for what purpose. See Rapp, supra. The time 
period for evaluating petitions for exemptions is 120 days, and many businesses are forced to employ 
legal assistance to navigate the administrative process. See Jason Reagan, UAV Group Offering Section 
333 Legal Package, DRONE LIFE (June 9, 2015), http://dronelife.com/2015/06/09/uav-group-offering-
section-333-legal-package/. As of February 18, 2016, 3,459 petitions had been granted. Section 333, 
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/ (last visited Sept. 28, 
2016). 
 15. E.g., Anita Ramasastry, Drones as the New Peeping Toms?, VERDICT (June 26, 2014), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2014/06/26/drones-new-peeping-toms; Daniel Victor, F.A.A. Opens Inquiry 
After Baby Hurt in Drone Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/ 
business/drone-crash-injures-baby-highlighting-faa-concerns.html?_r=1; Jessica Heslam, Guests Suing 
Groom Over Drone Crash, BOSTON HERALD (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.bostonherald.com/news/ 
columnists/jessica_heslam/2016/12/heslam_ 
guests_suing_groom_over_drone_crash. 
 16. E.g., Drone Flying in Brooklyn Heights Startles Residents, NBC 4 N.Y. (Aug. 15, 2015, 3:20 
AM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/on-air/as-seen-on/Drone-Flying-in-Brooklyn-Heights-Startles-
Residents_New-York-321937741.html; Leawood Man Says Peeping Tom Flew Drone next to Teen 
Daughter’s Window, FOX 4 NEWS KAN. CITY (Oct. 9, 2015, 10:37 PM), 
http://fox4kc.com/2015/10/09/leawood-man-says-peeping-tom-flew-drone-next-to-teen-daughters-
window/; James Queally, L.A. City Attorney Files First Criminal Charges Under New Drone 
Ordinance, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 2:31 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-city-
attorney-drones-20160120-story.html (“Two men accused of flying drones in the vicinity of a hospital 
and police heliports will be the first to face criminal charges under Los Angeles’ new drone 
restrictions.”); Winnie Wright, Valdosta Police Officer Fired, Arrested for Eavesdropping with Drone, 
WCTV (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.wctv.tv/home/headlines/Valdosta-Police-Officer-Fired-Arrested-
For-Eavesdropping-With-Drone.html (reporting a Valdosta Police Department officer was arrested in 
Lanier County after neighbors reported he eavesdropped on them with a drone). Pop culture is even 
getting in to the mix, airing episodes on the ABC hit television show Modern Family and Comedy 
Central’s South Park involving drones relentlessly following people. Modern Family: Drone Vs. Idiots 
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residents call the police. Yet in many cities and towns, no pertinent 
laws exist to regulate this activity, leaving some people to resort to 
self-help remedies such as shooting the drone down or throwing 
objects at it.17 
The privacy concerns relating to drones stem from their 
capabilities. These aerial observers enable operators to gather 
information about people and places via cameras, live video-
streaming capability, and sensory-enhancing technologies that can be 
mounted to the drone.18 Once collected, information can be stored 
forever and broadly disseminated electronically. 19  Moreover, the 
drones’ aerial positioning makes it difficult for anyone without prior 
notice to avoid being caught on their cameras.20 
The FAA’s mandate to integrate unmanned aircraft into U.S. 
airspace focuses on safety, not privacy.21 The sheer volume of drones 
																																																																																																																																
(ABC television broadcast Mar. 4, 2015); South Park: The Magic Bush (Comedy Central television 
broadcast Oct. 29, 2014). 
 17. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages at 1, Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-cv-6-
DJH, 2016 WL 66951, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 4, 2016) (drone operator sues his neighbor for shooting 
down his drone flying at 200 feet above ground); Steven Hoffer, Kentucky Man Arrested for Shooting 
Down Neighbor’s Drone, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 3, 2015, 12:36 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/man-shoots-neighbors-drone_us_55bf8127e4b0d4f33a034e31; 
see also Chris Matyszczyk, Drone Shooter Pleads Guilty, CNET (Feb. 14, 2016, 12:49 PM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/man-who-shot-down-drone-pleads-guilty/; Ana Cabrera, Colorado Town’s 
Vote on Drone Ordinance Postponed, CNN (Dec. 10, 2013, 9:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/ 
12/10/us/colorado-town-drone-ordinance/ (reporting a town in Colorado proposed a bounty for drones 
shot down). 
 18. JUST. TECH. INFO. CTR., LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE CONCERNING SUSPECTED 
UNAUTHORIZED UAS OPERATIONS 2 (2016), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/UAS-LEA-Guidance-White-
Paper-7_8_16.pdf; see also Bill McNeil, The Top Five Things You Need to Know About Drones and 
GIS, DIRECTIONS MAGAZINE (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.directionsmag.com/entry/top-five-things-
you-need-to-know-about-drones-and-gis/414810; Joshua Goldman, This Is What It’s Like to Live Stream 
from a DIG Drone to Facebook, CNET (May 24, 2016, 10:14 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/dji-
drones-now-let-you-facebook-live-from-the-sky/. 
 19. See Droneware, PROGRESSIVE TECH. FED. SYS., http://www.ptfs.com/library/public/PTFS-
Collateral/PTFS_Droneware_Overview_web.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2016). 
 20. See Nick Bilton, When Your Neighbor’s Drone Pays an Unwelcome Visit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/28/style/neighbors-drones-invade-privacy.html. 
 21. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,190 
(June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, et al.) (“[T]he FAA notes that its mission is 
to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world, and does not include regulating 
privacy.”); Cecilia Kang, F.A.A. Issues Commercial Drone Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/technology/drone-rules-commercial-use-
faa.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r=1 (“Pilots and privacy groups that pushed 
hard for greater safety provisions and strong surveillance rules expressed fear that clearing the way for 
more of the flying machines posed new dangers and few protections from spying.”). 
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in our skies makes accidents inevitable. At alarming rates, pilots of 
passenger jets are reporting drones flying near airports, flying in 
restricted airspace, and interfering with the flight paths of 
commercial airliners, especially during take-off and landing.22 There 
have been reports of drones malfunctioning and falling from the sky, 
causing injury and damage to people and property.23 The insurance 
industry is beginning to respond to this new market as the number of 
manufacturers, commercial operators, and homeowners seeking to 
protect themselves from risk and liability grows. 24  Homeowner 
																																																																																																																																
 22. See e.g., Katie Brace, Drone Spotted Near Logan Airport for Second Time in a Week, CBS 
BOSTON (Jan. 1, 2016, 10:32 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2016/01/01/drone-spotted-logan-airport-
boston/ (two sightings within one week of drones flying in restricted airspace next to Boston’s Logan 
Airport); Jad Mouawad, Risk to Aircraft from Drones Being Debated, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/business/risk-to-aircraft-from-drones-being-debated.html (reports 
of a drone near Kennedy Airport in New York and a near miss between a California Highway Patrol 
helicopter and a drone); Joseph Serna, LAPD Detains Man They Say Was Flying Drone Too Close to 
Police Helicopter, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015, 7:44 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
ln-lapd-detains-drone-pilot-20150828-story.html (police helicopter in Los Angeles forced to take 
evasive maneuvers after a drone flies too close); Scott Sonner, FAA Probes Drone Near-Miss with Reno 
Firefighting Copter, WASH. TIMES (June 17, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/ 
jun/17/faa-probes-drone-near-miss-with-reno-firefighting-/ (near miss between a drone and a 
firefighting helicopter near Reno, Nevada); Craig Whitlock, Close Encounters on Rise as Small Drones 
Gain in Popularity, WASH. POST (June 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/ 
2014/06/23/close-encounters-with-small-drones-on-rise/ (encounters between commercial jetliners and 
unmanned vehicles flying several thousand feet in the sky near LaGuardia and LAX airports). 
 23. Edgar Alvarez, Drone Camera Almost Takes out a Skier on Live TV, ENGADGET (Dec. 22, 
2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/12/22/drone-camera-almost-crashes-into-skier/ (malfunctioning 
drone almost hits World champion skier at race in Italy); Ryan Kath, Drone Crashes, Hits 2 People 
During Marblehead Parade, CBS BOSTON (May 25, 2015, 5:54 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2015/ 
05/25/drone-crashes-hits-2-people-during-marblehead-parade/ (drone crashes into building and injures 
two people at a Memorial Day parade in Marblehead, Massachusetts); Steve Miletich, Drone Operator 
Charged with Knocking out Woman at Pride Parade, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015, 5:10 PM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/drone-operator-charged-with-knocking-out-woman-at-
pride-parade/ (drone crashes into building and knocks a woman unconscious during the Pride Parade in 
downtown Seattle); Julia Talanova, Drone Slams into Seating Area at U.S. Open; Teacher Arrested, 
CNN (Sept. 5, 2015, 11:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/04/us/us-open-tennis-drone-arrest/ (New 
York City teacher arrested after his drone crashes into an empty section of seats during a match at the 
U.S. Open). 
 24. See, e.g., UAS UAV Drone Insurance, TRANSPORT RISK MGMT., www.transportrisk.com/ 
uavrcfilm.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2016). UAS insurance is comparable to insurance for planes and 
helicopters. See Drone Insurance Guide: UAV, UAS, & Quadcopter Liability Coverage, UAV COACH, 
http://uavcoach.com/drone-insurance-guide/ (last updated Oct. 2016). Insurance may include party 
property coverage for theft or damage to drones. Id. It may also include third party liability coverage for 
property damage and bodily injury caused by drones. Id. Manufacturers, retailers, service providers 
make may seek product liability insurance. Id. In other words, the insurance market for drones has 
enormous potential and is applicable to drones just as it is to many motorized vehicles with some 
additional coverage such as system hacking. 
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policies for community associations have started including “risks 
from drones” as an option in underwriting.25 Eventually, insurance 
may become mandatory for unmanned aircraft, similar to insurance 
requirements for motorized vehicles in most states.26 As claims for 
drone related accidents become more common, so too will the 
number of lawsuits filed against operators and manufacturers for not 
only injury to persons, but also for interference with the use and 
enjoyment of property and intrusions into privacy.27 
With the advent of drones, we have entered a new frontier of aerial 
observation with the unmanned aircraft.28 Enthusiasts want to know 
which operations are lawful and which are prohibited.29 Homeowners 
who are watching drones fly over their yards and peer into windows 
are asking what rights and remedies they have to curtail intrusive 
drone use.30 The question on many lawmakers’ minds is whether 
existing laws provide adequate remedies or whether this technology 
falls through a legal gap.31 As is often the case with any new and 
prolific technology, unmanned aircraft is outpacing the law. 32 
Controversies over whether a drone can hover above one’s property 
at low altitudes, whether it is legal to capture images of those on the 
ground without consent, and whether one may destroy a drone 
intruding upon one’s privacy are mounting legal issues. 33  The 
question courts and lawmakers should be addressing is whether 
existing trespass, nuisance, and privacy laws provide adequate legal 
																																																																																																																																
 25. Recreational Drone Risk and Homeowners Insurance, VERISK, http://www.verisk.com/between-
the-lines/april-2016/recreational-drone-risk-and-homeowners-insurance.html (last visited Nov. 11, 
2016). 
 26. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 203 (2015). 
 27. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages, supra note 17; Geoffrey 
Christopher Rapp, Unmanned Aerial Exposure: Civil Liability Concerns Arising from Domestic Law 
Enforcement Employment of Unmanned Aerial Systems, 85 N.D. L. REV. 623, 632 (2009). 
 28. See Should You Be Allowed to Prevent Drones From Flying Over Your Property?, WALL 
STREET J. (May 22, 2016, 10:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/should-you-be-allowed-to-prevent-
drones-from-flying-over-your-property-1463968981; See Blitz et al., supra note 7, at 53 
 29. Id. 
 30. Rule, supra note 26, at 170; ALISSA M. DOLAN & RICHARD THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., INTEGRATION OF DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (2013). 
 31. See Rule, supra note 26, at 157. 
 32. Id. at 163–64, 169–70. 
 33. See id. at 170; A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo, Self Defense Against Robots and 
Drones, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015). 
2017] PRIVACY TORTS AND DRONES 365 
remedies.34 If laws do not provide legal redress for those negatively 
impacted by drone operations, then people will assuredly take matters 
into their own hands.35 In some instances where the law is perceived 
as a fairly blunt tool, people will increasingly resort to self-help 
remedies.36 Not only are these measures dangerous, but many will 
result in criminal prosecutions and civil suits over damaged 
property.37 
This article sets out to answer these questions at a time when 
lawmakers are feverishly proposing drone specific legislation. 38 
Presently, forty-nine states have considered legislation seeking to 
regulate drones.39 Thirty-one states have passed laws that limit the 
use of drones.40 The majority of these laws provide for civil penalties 
and causes of action for capturing images and recordings of 
individuals via drone without consent.41 Before the ink dries on these 
newly minted bills and incidents ripen into lawsuits, we should be 
asking whether our long-standing common law torts offer remedies 
of equal or greater value than these rapidly developing new laws. To 
the extent that common law torts fall short of providing adequate 
remedies at law, understanding their shortcomings will strengthen 
future drone legislation. 
Part I of this article explains the FAA’s current and proposed rules 
for drone operators in the wake of the massive popularity of drones.42 
																																																																																																																																
 34. Rapp, supra note 27, at 645. 
 35. Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 33, at 6. 
 36. See Matyszczyk, supra note 17; Hoffer, supra note 17. 
 37. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages, supra note 17; Ariel Zangla, David 
Beesmer Acquitted in Town of Ulster Drone Surveillance Case, DAILY FREEMAN POLICE NEWS (June 
22, 2015, 11:55 AM), http://www.dailyfreeman.com/general-news/20150622/david-beesmer-acquitted-
in-town-of-ulster-drone-surveillance-case. 
 38. Eyragon Eidam, Report: Drone Legislation a Priority for States Across the U.S., GOV’T TECH. 
(July 11, 2016), http://www.govtech.com/policy/Report-Drone-Legislation-a-Priority-for-States-Across-
the-US.html. 
 39. Id. Every state in the country, except for South Dakota, has considered some kind of 
rule-making. Id. Thirty-two states have taken legislative action to regulate unmanned aircraft. Id. 
 40. Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG. (Oct. 7, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx. 
 41. State Drone Legislation Continues in Absence of Federal Regulations, MULTISTATE INSIDER 
(Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.multistate.com/insider/2015/11/state-drone-legislation-continues-in-
absence-of-federal-regulations/. 
 42. See infra Part I. 
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Part II describes the capabilities of unmanned aircraft to help 
understand the growing concern over privacy intrusions.43 Part III 
examines the legislative activity among states seeking to limit drone 
use as a means of protecting privacy. 44  Part IV explains the 
application of the torts of trespass, nuisance, and invasion of privacy 
to drones, and those claims’ limitations.45 Part V suggests that state 
and local governments can implement regulations for low altitude 
airspace that are designed to safeguard privacy and not conflict with 
current FAA rules.46 
I. THE FAA AND THE SOARING PRESENCE OF DRONES 
In 2015 drone sales worldwide hit an all-time record of 4.3 
million.47 This marks an increase of 167% in just two years.48 Most 
drones sold in the U.S. retail for between $400 and $1400.49 It is 
estimated that Americans bought 400,000 drones during the 2015 
holiday season.50 Trade industry experts estimated that more than 2.8 
million drones were sold in the U.S. in 2016 and 4.8 million will be 
sold in 2017.51 At the 2016 Consumer Electronic Show (CES), the 
world’s largest annual electronics show, CES organizers said the U.S. 
drone market revenue reached $105 million in 2015, an increase of 
more than 50% from 2014.52 In 2015, the drone industry’s revenue 
totaled $261 million, a value expected to almost double in 2016.53 
																																																																																																																																
 43. See infra Part II. 
 44. See infra Part III. 
 45. See infra Part IV. 
 46. See infra Part V. 
 47. Bedard, supra note 3. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Steven A. Rosenberg, Barnstable Bans Drones from Beaches, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 25, 2016), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/04/25/barnstable-bans-drones-from-
beaches/llrN5zT38JJCnLHUdkOsqL/story.html. 
 50. Brustein, supra note 4. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Greg Sandoval, Sales of Commercial Drones Will Soar 84% in 2016–Despite Safety Concerns, 
GEEKWIRE.COM (Jan. 18, 2016, 8:47 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2016/sales-of-commercially-
used-drones-will-soar-84-in-2016-despite-safety-concerns/. 
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Demand for drones in the commercial arena is constantly 
expanding.54 The industries seeking permission from the FAA to use 
drones for commercial activities include businesses involved in 
agriculture, oil and gas, engineering, real estate, journalism, and 
filmmaking. 55  Several universities, such as Emory-Riddle 
Aeronautics University, Kansas State University, and the University 
of North Dakota, have begun to offer academic programs and degrees 
in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles.56 
In response to mounting private and government pressure to permit 
commercial enterprises to capitalize on the benefits of this new 
technology, the FAA released new regulations for persons sixteen 
years and older wishing to operate, for commercial purposes, a drone 
weighing less than fifty-five pounds.57 Beginning in August 2016, the 
FAA no longer requires commercial users to seek exemption under 
section 333 of the 2012 Federal Modernization and Reform Act.58 
Rather, commercial operations may commence once the operator 
completes a written exam and is vetted by the TSA.59 Commercial 
drones must stay within the visual line of sight of the pilot or the 
pilot’s “visual observer.”60  The pilot must avoid controlled space 
such as airports and must operate only in daylight, under 400 feet 
above ground level, and with a maximum speed of no more than 100 
mph. 61  Drones may not operate above any person not directly 
participating in the operation. 62  Additionally, all drones must be 
																																																																																																																																
 54. Barrie Barber, Drone-Related Job Growth to Outpace Predictions, GOV’T TECH. (Aug. 26, 
2015), http://www.govtech.com/budget-finance/Drone-Related-Job-Growth-to-Outpace-
Predictions.html. 
 55. Commercial Drone Shipments to Surpass 2.6 Million Units Annually by 2025, TRACTICA (July 
21, 2015), https://www.tractica.com/newsroom/press-releases/commercial-drone-shipments-to-surpass-
2-6-million-units-annually-by-2025-according-to-tractica/. 
 56. Dominic Basulto, Graduates with Drone Skills Are Going to Be in Demand Soon. Here’s Why., 
WASH. POST (May 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2014/05/13/ 
graduates-with-drone-skills-are-going-to-be-in-demand-soon-heres-why/. 
 57. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 
42,066–76 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, et al.). 
 58. Id. at 42,142–43. 
 59. Id. at 42,156. 
 60. Id. at 42,092–97. 
 61. Id. at 42,066 (400 feet ceiling), 42,102 (daytime hours), 42,111 (airspace restrictions), 42,121 
(100 mph maximum speed). 
 62. Id. at 42,066. 
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labeled with the appropriate markings and registration.63 These new 
rules will save significant time and money, and will spur thousands 
of businesses to begin executing their plans to use small drones for 
commercial activities.64 
Amidst the 2015 holiday shopping season, which prominently 
featured the latest consumer drones, the FAA instituted rules for 
small drones used for personal interest and enjoyment.65 The rules 
require that the drone: must not fly within five miles of an airport; 
must stay out of “drone free zones,” such as sporting events; must 
stay below 400 feet and within the visual line of sight of the operator; 
and must comply with all state and local laws.66 The mandate also 
requires the operator to register his drone with the FAA before taking 
flight.67 Registration includes providing a current address and email 
and paying a five dollar fee.68 This registration requirement applies to 
any operator thirteen years or older.69 The registration requirement is 
meant to make it easier to track down drone owners should an 
incident requiring investigation arise.70 Officials are spending time 
and resources with increased frequency trying to track down owners 
whose drones were spotted flying too close to commercial airliners or 
within restricted airspace, were involved in a crash, or were 
																																																																																																																																
 63. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,174–
75 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 21, 43, 61, et al.). 
 64. See id. at 42,067. The new rule provides a relatively limited authorization for commercial drones 
to transport property for compensation. Id. at 42,074–77. Notably, the flight must occur within the 
bounds of one state and the flight must be conducted within the visual line of sight of the remote pilot in 
command or of a visual observer. Id. at 42,076. To be clear, the delivery options are limited and do not 
open the skies to deliver of products by autonomous drones. Id. 
 65. FAA Announces Small UAS Registration Rule, supra note 9. 
 66. Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,593, 
(Dec. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 1, 45, 47, et al.); see also FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336, 125 Stat. 11, 77 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 67. FAA Announces Small UAS Registration Rule, supra note 9. As of February 2016, the FAA 
reported 370,000 such drones were registered. @FAANews, TWITTER (Feb. 23 2016, 11:08 AM), 
https://twitter.com/FAANews/status/702208529818636288. 
 68. FAA Announces Small UAS Registration Rule, supra note 9. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Hillary B. Farber, Let’s Make It Easy to Be Responsible with Drones, PROVIDENCE J. (Dec. 29, 
2015, 2:01 AM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20151229/OPINION/151229411 
[hereinafter Farber, Let’s Make It Easy]. 
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conducting unlawful surveillance. 71  If an operator fails to follow 
these rules or operates in a careless or reckless manner, the operator 
can be fined by the FAA.72 
With the vast number of drones taking flight, it is untenable for the 
FAA to patrol the skies and monitor compliance with the regulations. 
Simply put, the FAA does not have the resources to undertake both 
of these tasks.73 As a result, local law enforcement will likely be the 
first to respond to complaints about drones flying too close to people 
and property.74 Quite likely, the FAA will only become aware of 
alleged infractions after someone reports an incident.75 Individuals 
seeking damages for harm caused by a drone will seek recourse from 
the courts, despite any investigation the FAA may initiate.76 With the 
new regulations permitting many more drones to take to the skies, 
																																																																																																																																
 71. Jim Moore, Drones vs. FAA, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASS’N (Jan. 7, 2016), 
https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2016/january/07/drones-v-faa. 
 72. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2016). According to one news agency, the FAA has issued fines to 24 
drone operators or companies for alleged infractions with the regulations. Jason Koebler, The FAA Gave 
Us a List of Every Drone Pilot Who Has Ever Been Fined, MOTHERBOARD (June 1, 2016, 2:20 PM), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/faa-drone-fines. Fines imposed by the FAA range from $400 to 
$5,500. Id. In August 2015, a Minnesota man was fined $55,000 by the FAA for flying his drone in a 
reckless and careless manner. Melissa Quinn, He Flew a Drone to Take Photos for a Friend. Now He 
Faces $55K in Government Fines, DAILY SIGNAL (June 12, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/06/12/ 
he-flew-a-drone-to-take-photos-for-a-friend-now-hes-facing-55k-in-government-fines/. In 2012, 
Raphael Pirker was fined $10,000 by the FAA for flying a powered glider around the University of 
Virginia in violation of FAA rules that prohibits careless and reckless operation of an aircraft. Jack 
Nicas, U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Settles with Videographer over Drones, WALL STREET J. 
(Jan. 22, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-federal-aviation-administration-settles-with-
videographer-over-drones-1421960972. 
 73. FAA Issues UAS Guidance for Law Enforcement, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 8, 2015), 
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=81244; Scott Kraus, Shifting Landscape for Drones in the 
Lehigh Valley, MORNING CALL (Nov. 21, 2015, 6:55 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-lehigh-
valley-drones-20151121-story.html; Steven Nelson, FAA Wants Local Cops to Be Drone Police, U.S. 
NEWS (Feb. 24, 2015, 5:27 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/24/faa-wants-local-
cops-to-be-drone-police. 
 74. JUST. TECH. INFO. CTR., supra note 18, at 1; see also FAA Issues UAS Guidance for Law 
Enforcement, supra note 73. 
 75. See Nelson, supra note 73. Proving these infractions to the FAA may be difficult in that there 
may be a lack of evidence that the drone was operating in a prohibited manner, delays in response time 
from the FAA and substantial time lapse in resolving the alleged violation. See FAA Issues UAS 
Guidance for Law Enforcement, supra note 73. In many instances the FAA investigation may be 
thwarted by lack of evidence pertaining to the manner of operation, and even identifying the operator. 
See id. 
 76. Frederick E. Blakelock, Drone Wars: Will the Litigation Awaken?, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f8c9887f-d70a-4a25-98f4-abbbd8161e32. 
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courts will soon be involved in adjudicating matters involving 
drones.77 
II. UAS CAPABILITIES RAISE SAFETY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS 
Unmanned aircraft systems (“UAS”) are versatile, efficient, and 
often designed to be undetectable. 78  In light of their aerial 
perspective, UAS can cheaply and efficiently amass vast amounts of 
information about people and places.79 The unmanned aerial vehicle 
is simply the platform for enabling surveillance; the on-board 
instruments gather, store, and transmit the data. 80  Most UAS are 
equipped with cameras with high-powered zoom lenses and photo 
sensors for high-resolution imagery. 81  The more sophisticated 
systems offer more advanced on-board instruments, such as infrared 
sensors, night vision cameras, GPS systems, wi-fi sniffers, and 
automated license plate readers.82 They range in weight from tons to 
grams, depending on their design and purpose.83 These systems are 
easily operable from a ground control unit—often a smartphone or 
tablet.84 They can hover and fly in all directions.85 Many drones can 
sustain flight times of up to twenty minutes.86 As the technology 
develops, the flight time will increase exponentially.87 Most drones 
are battery-powered, although some are powered by fuel or solar.88 
																																																																																																																																
 77. See id. 
 78. Hillary B. Farber, Sensing and Surveillance: Constitutional Privacy Issues of Unmanned Aircraft 
in UNMANNED AIRCRAFT IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE: CRITICAL ISSUES, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE LAW 
225, 228 (Donna A. Dulo ed., 2015). 
 79. Id. at 229. 
 80. Id. at 228. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 228–29. 
 83. Id. at 228. 
 84. JUST. TECH. INFO. CTR., supra note 18, at 2; see also Briley Kenney, 5 Remote Control Drones 
You Can Take to the Skies with, CHEATSHEET (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.cheatsheet.com/gear-style/5-
remote-control-drones-you-can-take-to-the-skies-with.html/?a=viewall. 
 85. JUST. TECH. INFO. CTR., supra note 18, at 2; Farber, supra note 78, at 228. 
 86. 10 Drones with the Best Flight Times, DRONES GLOBE (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://www.dronesglobe.com/guide/long-flight-time/. The Justice Technology Information Center 
reports that flight times range anywhere from ten to forty-five minutes. JUST. TECH. INFO. CTR., supra 
note 18, at 2. 
 87. E.g., Sumit Passary, Hydrogen-Powered Drone Flies 6 Times Longer than Drones Using Normal 
Battery, TECH TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/144925/20160329/ 
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Many operators fly drones around their neighborhoods, over 
fenced-in backyards, near windows, and even around medical 
facilities.89 With its mounted camera, the drone can capture images 
and transmit video simultaneously to the ground unit.90 All of the 
data collected by the drone can be downloaded, stored, and 
disseminated like any other digital data. 91  Unmanned aerial 
surveillance can be surreptitious and nefarious.92 Compared to their 
manned counterparts, drones are almost silent and cannot easily be 
detected at several hundred feet in the sky.93 
In 2015, New York had its first criminal prosecution of a drone 
user for attempted unlawful surveillance.94 The case involved a New 
York resident, David Beesmer, charged with flying his lightweight, 
quad-copter drone around the premises of the Mid-Hudson Valley 
Medical Facility. 95  After dropping his mother off for a medical 
appointment, Beesmer launched his drone from the facility parking 
lot.96 When staff observed an object flying outside the windows of 
the examination rooms, they called police.97 Beesmer was charged 
with felony unlawful surveillance under the New York Penal Code.98 
																																																																																																																																
hydrogen-powered-drone-flies-6-times-longer-than-drones-using-normal-battery.htm. 
 88. Adi Arriansyah, The 6 Known Ways to Power a Drone, TECH IN ASIA (Jun. 23, 2016, 8:58 AM), 
https://www.techinasia.com/talk/6-known-ways-power-a-drone. 
 89. Kellan Howell, Drone Hovers Outside Hawaii Woman’s Window; No Crime Committed, WASH. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/aug/12/drone-hovers-outside-
hawaii-womans-window-no-crime/; Leawood Man Says Peeping Tom Flew Drone Next to Teen 
Daughter’s Window, supra note 16; Chris Matyszczyk, Peeping Drone Captures Woman Sunbathing 
Topless, CNET (Nov. 17, 2014, 8:55 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/peeping-drone-captures-woman-
sunbathing-topless/; Zangla, supra note 37. 
 90. See JUST. TECH. INFO. CTR., supra note 18, at 2; see also FPV Video Transmitter Buying Guide, 
DRONETREST (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.dronetrest.com/t/fpv-video-transmitter-buying-guide/1470. 
 91. JUST. TECH. INFO. CTR., supra note 18, at 2; Farber, supra note 78, at 228. 
 92. MATTHEW T. DEGARMO, MITRE CTR. FOR ADVANCED AVIATION SYS. DEV., ISSUES 
CONCERNING INTEGRATION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES IN CIVIL AIRSPACE 2–23 (2004), 
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/04_1232.pdf. 
 93. See Farber, supra note 78 at 225. 
 94. See Zangla, supra note 37. 
 95. Photographer Acquitted on UAV Charges, AERO NEWS NETWORK (Jun. 24, 2015), 
http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?do=main.textpost&id=03e3afe2-1cbc-4132-a42b-25a956ac7421. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Paula A. Mitchell, Suspect in Town of Ulster Drone Case Rejects Plea Deal, DAILY FREEMAN 
(Nov. 18, 2014, 5:13 PM), http://www.dailyfreeman.com/article/DF/20141118/NEWS/141119646. 
 98. Id.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (McKinney 2014). 
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Ultimately, Beesmer was acquitted by a jury.99 The statute under 
which Beesmer was charged requires the government prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Beesmer had the intent to see inside the 
structure. 100  However, the tinted windows of the medical facility 
made it virtually impossible to see inside. 101  Nonetheless, the 
Beesmer case raises questions as to how much privacy people can 
expect with aerial vehicles equipped with cameras flying around our 
skies. 102  The Beesmer case is hardly an isolated incident. Some 
municipalities initiated drone-free zones for particular events and 
structures due to concerns over low-flying cameras hovering over 
persons and private property.103 
The privacy concerns extend beyond the collection of information 
by the drone. The digital data a drone collects can be easily 
downloaded and shared with others instantaneously. 104  Suppose 
Beesmer was able to capture images of those inside the facility. 
Furthermore, suppose Beesmer then uploaded those images to a 
social media site and shared them with others. Would that constitute 
a violation of federal or state law? Would it matter if the images of 
people were captured outside the medical facility? The U.S. Supreme 
																																																																																																																																
 99. See Zangla, supra note 37. 
 100. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (McKinney 2014). 
 101. Zangla, supra note 37. 
 102. To be sure, government use of drones raises significant privacy issues and unresolved questions 
about whether the government can conduct unmanned aerial surveillance without complying with 
Fourth Amendment requirements. See generally Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and 
Regulatory Approaches to Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, at 4 [hereinafter Farber, 
Eyes in the Sky]; John Villasenor, Observation from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457 (2013). But non-governmental actors using drones for recreational or 
commercial purposes does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. See Farber, supra note 78, at 241–42; Villasenor, supra, at 498. A person seeking a 
remedy for an alleged intrusion to one’s privacy must rely on a private cause of action. These types of 
claims will be grounded in tort law, using the traditional common law torts of trespass, nuisance, and 
privacy torts to mount a claim against a drone operator. See Villasenor, supra, at 498–505. 
 103. E.g., Aaron Mamiit, Sorry, No Drones Allowed for Pope’s US Visit, TECH TIMES (Sept. 16, 
2015, 7:54 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/85120/20150916/sorry-no-drones-allowed-for-
popes-us-visit.htm (prohibiting drones in the Pope’s vicinity during his U.S. visit); Rosenberg, supra 
note 49 (banning drones over Cape Cod beaches); Security in Cleveland for GOP Convention Likely 
Ramping Up, Expert Says, WTOP (July 12, 2016, 2:56 AM), http://wtop.com/politics/2016/07/security-
in-cleveland-for-gop-convention-likely-ramping-up-expert-says/ (banning drones in Cleveland during 
the Republican National Convention). 
 104. See Data Sharing, DRONEDEPLOY, http://support.dronedeploy.com/docs/data-sharing (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
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Court poignantly acknowledged that a significant amount can be 
learned about a person just by tracking his movements in public.105 
Simply aggregating the coordinates of a person’s location can reveal 
information such as the state of one’s physical health, familial status, 
recreational habits, education level, social and political affiliations, 
financial status, religiosity, and employment. 106  The type of 
technology the Court discussed in United States v. Jones was a global 
positioning system used to track one individual.107 The breadth and 
scope of information that can be amassed by aerial surveillance 
tracking large numbers of people is far greater.108 
The Beesmer case raises questions as to whether existing criminal 
laws are adequate to protect the privacy interests of individuals in the 
face of this powerful technology. Many states have criminal statutes 
similar to the one under which Beesmer was charged.109 Some of 
these criminal statutes are known as voyeurism laws.110 All require 
proof of the defendant’s intent to capture information pertaining to 
the target of the surveillance.111 The mens rea requirement poses 
difficulties for the prosecution if a drone operator cannot see what he 
is filming and only learns of the existence of the images after the 
flight concludes. 
																																																																																																																																
 105. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations. . . . The Government can store 
such records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future. And 
because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance 
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that constrain abusive law enforcement practices[.] 
Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. at 402–03. 
 108. See Farber, Eyes in the Sky, supra note 102, at 6. 
 109. See generally NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NDAA VOYEURISM COMPILATION (2010), 
http://www.ndaajustice.org/pdf/Voyeurism%202010.pdf (compiling surveillance states across the 
United States). Statutes may have different names such as “Video Voyeurism” and “Unlawful 
Surveillance.” Id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
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III. UAS LEGISLATION THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES 
In response to the vast privacy concerns over these aerial 
observers, lawmakers created legislation limiting the use of 
unmanned aircraft systems. Since 2013 a flurry of state legislative 
activity has restricted how, and by whom, unmanned aircraft can be 
operated.112 Between 2013 and 2016, every state with the exception 
of South Dakota has considered legislation on drone use. 113 
Presently, thirty-one states have laws that expressly regulate the 
operation of unmanned aircraft. 114  These restrictions limit the 
collection, retention, and dissemination of information gathered by 
unmanned aircraft systems.115 The first states to adopt legislation on 
UAS confined their bills to restrict government use of UAS. 116 
Florida and Idaho were two of the first states to pass legislation 
specific to UAS.117 The main purpose of these laws was to require 
law enforcement to obtain a warrant prior to using drones for 
criminal investigations unless exigent circumstances apply.118 Other 
states followed suit, almost all of which included exceptions for 
emergencies, search and rescue missions, and terrorist threats.119 
By 2014 states were widening the scope of their UAS restrictions 
to include private use of unmanned aircraft. Among the thirty-one 
states with drone laws, sixteen include restrictions on private 
																																																																																																																																
 112. Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, supra note 40. 
 113. ESSEX, supra note 7, at 5 
 114. See Farber, Let’s Make It Easy, supra note 70. 
 115. See Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, supra note 40. 
 116. See 2013 State Unmanned Aircraft Systems Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG. (July 2, 
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/2013-state-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-
legislation.aspx. 
 117. See S.B. 92, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); S.B. 1134, 62d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 
2013). 
 118. See, e.g., H.B. 255, 28th Leg. (Alaska 2014); S.B. 92, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); 
S.B. 1134, 62d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013); S.B. 1587, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 
2013); S.B. 1331, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013); S.B. 196, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Wis. 
2014). 
 119. See, e.g., S.B. 744, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2014); H.B. 2710, 77th Leg. Assemb. (Or. 2013); 
S.B. 796, 108th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013); H.B. 912, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013); S.B. 167, 
2014 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014); S.B. 1331, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013); S.B. 196, 2013–
2014 Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014). 
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operators. 120  Because unmanned aircraft systems are relatively 
inexpensive, hugely popular, and capable of capturing images from 
hundreds of feet in the sky, the most common restriction for private 
users is the prohibition on recording a person without his or her 
consent. 121  Florida was one of the first states to pass legislation 
restricting government use of unmanned aircraft.122 Two years later, 
the Florida legislature voted to prohibit private individuals from 
using drones to record images of persons or property without prior 
consent.123 The law grants a cause of action against anyone who, 
without prior consent, uses a drone to capture images of persons or 
objects on private property if a reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists. 124  The Florida statute defines reasonable expectation of 
privacy as being when a person cannot be seen by others at ground 
level where they have a legal right to be regardless of whether he or 
she is observable from the sky.125  Many of these new laws also 
include altitude restrictions, the requirement that the operator 
maintain a visual line of sight with the device at all times, and 
prohibitions on nighttime use.126 
Oregon and Nevada take a property rights approach to airspace.127 
Oregon passed a law granting landowners a civil cause of action 
against anyone who flies a drone over another’s property at a height 
of less than 400 feet.128 The law allows treble damages for any injury 
to person or property caused by the drone. 129  Moreover, one 
provision of the statute grants authority to the Attorney General to 
																																																																																																																																
 120. See, e.g., H.B. 255, 28th Leg. (Alaska 2014); FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2015); S.B. 1134, 62d Leg., 
1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013); H.B. 1009, 118th Gen. Assemb. (Ind. 2014); H.B. 2289, 85th Gen. Assemb. 
(Iowa 2014); H.B. 1029, 2014 Reg. Sess. (La. 2014); S.B. 744, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2014); H.B. 
2710, 77th Leg. Assemb. (Or. 2013); H.B. 912, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013); S.B. 167, 2014 Gen. Sess. (Utah 
2014); S.B. 1331, S.B. 1331, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013); S.B. 196, 2013–2014 Reg. 
Sess. (Wis. 2014); see also Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, supra note 40. 
 121. See e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (2015); FLA. STAT. § 934.50(3)(b) (2015). 
 122. S.B. 92, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013). 
 123. FLA. STAT. § 934.50(3)(b) (2015). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Rapp, supra note 14. 
 127. See OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380 (2016); Assemb. B. 239, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015). 
 128. OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380. 
 129. Id. § 837.380(4). 
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bring a nuisance or trespass suit against a drone operator. 130 
Similarly, every property owner in Nevada is authorized to prohibit a 
drone from entering the airspace up to 250 feet above the owner’s 
property.131 Nevada’s law creates an action in trespass for anyone 
flying a drone less than 250 feet over another person’s property 
without permission.132 This law took effect in October 2015.133 
Hawaii proposed an amendment to its nuisance law by adding a 
reference to unmanned aircraft to avoid the interpretation that the 
statute did not apply to unmanned aerial vehicles.134 The proposed 
language included, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to operate 
an unmanned aircraft system across or above the state in a manner 
that constitutes a nuisance to the public, a person or the property of 
another.”135 Another recently proposed law grants a cause of action 
to anyone who, without consent, is photographed or is the subject of 
surveillance or observation against the unmanned systems 
operator.136 
In October 2015, the California legislature passed AB 856—
otherwise known as the “anti-paparazzi statute.”137 The law prohibits 
using a drone to capture an image or recording of a person engaging 
in a private, personal, or familial activity without permission.138 
Many states are proposing new criminal laws specific to drones.139 
For instance, the Rhode Island General Assembly introduced a law 
making it a felony to use a drone to look into a dwelling or other 
building. 140  Similarly, Michigan proposes to make it a crime to 
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As has been mentioned, the aerial perspective poses challenges for anyone seeking to conceal himself 
from view via conventional approaches such as installing a tall fence, gates around one’s property and 
security personnel to keep out the fan base. Farber, supra note 78, at 225. 
 139. See H.B. 7334, 2016 Leg. (R.I. 2016); H.B. 4868 § 98(1)(D), 98th Leg. (Mich. 2016); H.B. 609, 
28th Leg. (Haw. 2015). 
 140. H.B. 7334, 2016 Leg. (R.I. 2016). 
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knowingly operate an unmanned aircraft to trespass above the land of 
another person with the intent to subject them to eavesdropping or 
surveillance. 141  Finally, Hawaii initiated legislation curtailing 
unmanned aircraft surveillance by private entities out of concern for 
the privacy of its citizens and the freedom from unwanted 
surveillance.142 The proposed law makes it a criminal offense for any 
private entity to use an unmanned aircraft to conduct surveillance, 
observe, or photograph a person or dwelling in a non-public setting 
without prior written consent.143 
The catalyst for the precipitous rise in drone legislation is 
privacy.144 Lawmakers are largely concerned with the potential threat 
to personal privacy presented by the proliferation of these aerial 
observers. 145  Efforts to create an enforceable privacy interest are 
evinced in the titles of the legislation: the Florida Freedom from 
Unwanted Surveillance Act;146 the Idaho Preserving Freedom from 
Unwarranted Surveillance Act; 147  and the Illinois Freedom from 
Drone Surveillance Act.148 Georgia’s preamble to an act regulating 
flights over land and waters also contains strong privacy language.149 
																																																																																																																																
 141. H.B. 4868 § 98(1)(D), 98th Leg. (Mich. 2016). 
 142. H.B. 609 § 1, 28th Leg. (Haw. 2015). 
 143. Id. § 2. 
 144. Robert Holly, States Restrict Drone Use Because of Privacy Concerns, MIDWEST CTR. FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Mar. 21, 2014), http://investigatemidwest.org/2014/03/21/states-restrict-
drone-use-because-of-privacy-concerns/. 
 145. See id. 
 146. Florida Freedom From Unwanted Surveillance Act, FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2013). 
 147. Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, IDAHO CODE § 21-213 (2013). 
 148. Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167 (2013). 
 149. H.B. 157, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). 
The right to privacy is fundamental in a free and civilized society. Persons within 
the state of Georgia have a reasonable and justifiable expectation of privacy that 
they will not be monitored by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by law 
enforcement agents of the United States or the State of Georgia without a warrant 
based upon probable cause first being issued. The potential benefit to law 
enforcement and criminal justice from the use of UAVs without a warrant first 
being issued is far outweighed by the degradation to the fundamental right to 
privacy secured by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of 
Georgia that will result from law enforcement use of UAVs without first 
obtaining a warrant. 
Id. 
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Maintaining one’s privacy has grown increasingly complicated 
with advancements in technology. Reliance on third parties to 
provide the means by which people communicate and transact 
business—personal or professional—is unavoidable.150 Every day we 
relinquish and store a multitude of personal information using our 
digital devices.151 Lawmakers have focused their sights on drones 
because of how quickly they have proliferated throughout society.152 
The legislative approach has been to design laws that aim to protect 
individual privacy by regulating how the technology should be 
used.153 In some instances, these legislative measures have filled a 
gap in the law in order to curtail abuses of the technology.154 Some 
critics of this approach argue that it is inefficient—even short-
sighted—to legislate drone technology as opposed to legislating 
conduct and then assessing on a case-by-case basis whether the 
technology being used to bring about the harm—for example, 
pervasive surveillance—fits within the statute.155 One scholar argues 
that “this technology-centric approach creates perverse results, 
allowing the use of extremely sophisticated and pervasive 
surveillance technologies from manned aircraft, while potentially 
disallowing benign—non-privacy-invasive—uses of drones for 
mundane tasks like accident and crime scene documentation, or 
monitoring of industrial pollution and other environmental harms.”156 
																																																																																																																																
 150. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties . . . . This approach is ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks. 
Id. 
 151. See Farber, Eyes in the Sky, supra note 102, at 17. “For instance, online banking, online payment 
systems, renewing a driver’s license or registration, making airline reservations, and paying bar dues are 
all necessary tasks that require disclosure of confidential information.” Id. 
 152. See Holly, supra note 144. 
 153. See e.g., H.B. 1349, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015); S.B. 856, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2015); S.B. 2022, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015). 
 154. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012). 
 155. Roger Clarke & Lyria Bennett Moses, The Regulation of Civilian Drones’ Impacts on Public 
Safety, 30 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 263, 267 (2014); Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the 
Future of Aerial Surveillance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354, 360, 365 (2016). 
 156. McNeal, supra note 155, at 360. 
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While it is true that other emerging technologies pose risks of 
intrusions into one’s private matters, none are as prolific as drones at 
the present time. Currently, there is no other technology that is as 
accessible to the general public and poses as tangible a threat to 
privacy and safety as the drone.157 Millions of people own drones and 
many want to know how and where they can use them before they 
operate them.158 From a legislative perspective it is hard to deny the 
temptation and motivation to craft laws designed specifically to 
address the concerns and questions that so many in the public have 
about drone use.159 
As lawmakers consider new legislation aimed at narrowing the 
permissible use of drones, it is prudent to ask whether existing laws 
already prohibit the targeted conduct. 160  If flying a drone over 
someone’s backyard at a relatively low altitude constitutes a trespass 
or a nuisance, then what is the utility of passing another law that 
specifically forbids drones from engaging in such conduct? If taking 
a photograph of someone without consent can constitute an invasion 
of privacy, depending on whether an expectation of privacy exists, 
then why pass a new law that states it is illegal to do that same thing 
with a drone? 
IV. COMMON LAW TORTS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO NEW 
TECHNOLOGY—DRONES 
The capability of drones, now and in the future, appears to extend 
beyond the reach of traditional common law torts designed to protect 
																																																																																																																																
 157. See JUST. TECH. INFO. CTR., supra note 18, at 2–3; see also Carol Cratty, FBI Uses Drones for 
Surveillance in U.S., CNN: POLITICS (June 20, 2013, 7:27 AM), www.cnn.com/2013/06/19/politics/fbi-
drone/ (“I think the greatest threat to the privacy of Americans is the drone . . . .” (quoting Senate 
Intelligence Comm. Chairman Dianne Feinstein)); see also Farber, Eyes in the Sky, supra note 102, at 7. 
 158. See Rule, supra note 26, at 165; Craig Whitlock, Rogue Drones a Growing Nuisance Across the 
U.S., WASH. POST, (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-
rogue-drones-are-rapidly-becoming-a-national-nuisance/2015/08/10/9c05d63c-3f61-11e5-8d45-
d815146f81fa_story.html. 
 159. See, e.g., Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2016). The 
plethora of proposed legislation among all the states is testament to the belief among lawmakers that 
they need to legislate drones specifically. See generally ESSEX, supra note 7. 
 160. For a description of state laws that might address improper drone conduct see JUST. TECH. INFO. 
CTR., supra note 18, at 5–7. 
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privacy and property rights. Torts such as trespass, nuisance, and 
intrusion upon seclusion are limited in significant ways when applied 
to drone technology. 161  This is due in large part to a drone’s 
versatility to operate at lower and higher elevations without 
compromising its ability to capture the quality of the imagery at 
ground level.162 Highly sophisticated, sensory enhancing instruments 
that are equipped to the drone’s platform make proximity to the 
target of the surveillance hardly relevant. 163  On the other hand, 
physical proximity is a key element in trespass and intrusion upon 
seclusion claims.164 Moreover, because of their size, drones will not 
typically whip up soil, scare livestock, or disturb one’s use and 
enjoyment of land in ways that courts have traditionally found to 
constitute a nuisance.165 In this regard, a plaintiff’s circumstances in 
the drone context may be factually distinct from traditional claims 
under these three torts. This may well undermine any reliance on our 
current tort scheme to provide relief on controversies involving 
drones. Identifying the limitations of these traditional torts when 
applied to unmanned aircraft may well strengthen the laws that are 
being drafted specifically for drones. 
A. Trespass 
The tort of trespass is recognized in every jurisdiction.166 Trespass 
is a cause of action enabling a plaintiff to protect a possessory 
interest in land.167 The Restatement Second of Torts distinguishes 
																																																																																																																																
 161. See Villasenor, supra note 102, at 499–503. 
 162. See, e.g., Phantom 4 Specs, DJI, https://www.dji.com/phantom-4/info (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). 
For instance, a drone may hover over a property at elevations above 400 feet and capture high-resolution 
photographs of the same quality as if it were flying at fifty feet above ground. Id. 
 163. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DOMESTIC DRONES AND PRIVACY: A 
PRIMER 3 (2015). 
 164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 165. See Id. § 821D cmt. b. 
 166. Rebecca L. Rausch, Reframing ROE: Property Over Privacy, 27 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 
28, 51 (2012). 
 167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Although the Restatement 
imposes the burden that the interference be substantial, it is unclear how substantial the interference 
need be, because as the comments to the Restatement point out—even waving your arm over a fence 
and into a neighbor’s property constitutes a trespass. Id. § 159 cmt. f. illus. 3; see e.g., Herrin v. 
Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 329, 332 (Mont. 1925) (finding that a bullet disturbed the plaintiff’s “quiet, 
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between real property and airspace above one’s land.168 Section 158 
of the Restatement establishes the elements for physical trespass to 
land.169 For a claim to be successful, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant: (1) entered the land without authorization, or “cause[d] a 
thing or a third person to do so”; (2) “remain[ed] on the land”; or (3) 
“fail[ed] to remove from the land a thing which he [had] a duty to 
remove.”170 A person who intentionally invades another’s possessory 
property interest may be liable even if the person did not cause any 
particular harm.171 As early as 1835, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina recognized that every intentional unauthorized entry onto 
someone else’s land is a trespass.172 The court reasoned that every 
such entry results in some damage, whether actual or inferred.173 
Trespass actions may also include incursions beneath the surface 
of the ground or in the airspace above the land to a reasonable 
extent.174 Flight by an aircraft in the air space above the land of 
another is trespass if (1) “[the aircraft] enters into the immediate 
reaches of the air space next to the land, and (2) [it] interferes 
substantially with the other’s use and enjoyment of the land.”175 
Flying at a low altitude may constitute a trespass even when the 
object never touches down on the property.176 Courts will consider 
																																																																																																																																
undisturbed, peaceful enjoyment” of land and was thus a trespass where defendant was standing still and 
fired his shotgun at ducks, and the bullet flew over the plaintiff’s land without touching down). 
 168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 169. Id. § 158. Courts have found defendants liable under trespass theory when an object has invaded 
plaintiff’s property, whether that object is tangible or intangible. See e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 
342 P.2d 790, 797 (1959) (finding non-tangible gaseous fluorides from defendant’s machinery 
constituted a trespass even though the “thing” that entered plaintiff’s land was not tangible). 
 170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 171. See id. 
 172. Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 372 (1835). 
 173. Id. (reasoning that just by treading onto the plaintiff’s grass, the defendant caused harm); see 
also Forest City Cotton Co. v. Mills, 10 S.E.2d 806, 806 (N.C. 1940) (“In trespass, the plaintiff is 
entitled to recover nominal damages if he only show that the defendant broke his close.”); Lee v. 
Stewart, 10 S.E.2d 804, 805–06 (N.C. 1940) (holding that the defendant walking onto the farmland of 
the plaintiff presents an issue of trespass for the jury). 
 174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 175. See id. § 159(2). Interestingly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts includes as part of its 
definition principles commonly found in nuisance law. See id. Specifically, the Restatement provides 
that over-flights are trespasses if: (1) they are in the immediate reaches of the land, and (2) they interfere 
with the use and enjoyment. Id. 
 176. See id. 
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the proximity of the flying object to the land or structure and the 
reach of one’s possessory interest in airspace.177 
The vexing problem emerging since drones took to the skies is 
where a landowner’s airspace rights begin and end.178 Prior to the 
mid-twentieth century, landowners in the United States were said to 
own everything on their land “from the depths of the Earth to the 
Heavens above.”179 This principle—first articulated by Lord Edward 
Coke and later by William Blackstone—became known as the “ad 
coelum” doctrine and came to represent pre-twentieth century 
American law on airspace rights.180 
Toward the early part of the twentieth century, modern aviation 
and the ad coelum doctrine began to conflict. 181  As airplanes 
populated our skies, it became clear that granting landowners rights 
to airspace would make it virtually impossible for an aircraft to fly 
without first seeking authority from every landowner whose property 
it traveled over.182 Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act in 1926, 
and later the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938. 183  This federal 
legislation authorized aircraft to fly at or above safe minimum 
altitudes, which became known as “navigable airspace.”184 By 1958, 
the FAA defined navigable airspace as airspace above 500 feet, along 
																																																																																																																																
 177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. l (AM. LAW INST. 1979). The comments to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts explain how courts have interpreted “immediate reaches”: 
“Immediate reaches” of the land has not been defined as yet, except to mean that 
“the aircraft flights were at such altitudes as to interfere substantially with the 
landowner’s possession and use of the airspace above the surface.” No more 
definite line can be drawn than is suggested by the word “immediate.” In the 
ordinary case, flight at 500 feet or more above the surface is not within the 
“immediate reaches,” while flight within 50 feet, which interferes with actual use, 
clearly is, and flight within 150 feet, which also so interferes, may present a 
question of fact. 
Id. 
 178. Jack Nicas, Drones Boom Raises New Question: Who Owns Your Airspace?, WALL STREET J. 
(May 13, 2015, 12:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/drones-boom-raises-new-question-who-owns-
your-airspace-1431535417. 
 179. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946); Cujus est solum,ejus est usque ad coelom 
et ad inferos, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
 180. STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY?: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE 
WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 16–17 (2008); Rule, supra note 26, at 166. 
 181. Rule, supra note 26, at 166. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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with any lower “airspace needed to insure safety for take-off and 
landing[s].”185 The net result of these laws limited the scope of the ad 
coelum doctrine to airspace below 500 feet.186 
Even before the FAA issued its definition of navigable space, the 
United States Supreme Court essentially dismantled what was left of 
the ad coelum doctrine. 187  United States v. Causby declared the 
doctrine “has no place in the modern world,” and determined that 
“[t]he air is a public highway.”188 Causby squarely placed the issue of 
landowners’ property interests in airspace before the Court. 189  In 
Causby, the landowners operated a chicken farm next to a municipal 
airport that was being used by the Army and Navy during World War 
II. 190  The flight path for the aircrafts, depending on the wind 
conditions, would take them directly over the Causbys’ property at an 
elevation of eighty-three feet, and sometimes as low at sixty-seven 
feet above the house.191 The Causbys’ chickens were so frightened by 
the airplane noise that they would fly into walls and die. 192  The 
plaintiffs lost on average between six to ten chickens per day.193 As a 
result, the chicken farm closed, and the Causbys sued the U.S. 
government, alleging the government’s flight path and the 
subsequent loss of their chicken business resulted in a taking of their 
property.194 
The Supreme Court held that most flights over private lands are 
not a taking, because the airspace is “part of the public domain,” 
aside from the airspace within the immediate reaches of a property 
owner’s land. 195  Most importantly for this discussion, the Court 
explained that a landowner owns “at least as much of the space above 
																																																																																																																																
 185. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101(24), 72 Stat. 731. 
 186. See Rule, supra note 26, at 168. 
 187. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
 188. Id. at 261. 
 189. Richard A. Repp, Wrongs and Rights in Superterraneous Airspace: Causby and the Courts, 9 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 460, 463 (1967). 
 190. Causby, 328 U.S. at 258. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 259. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. at 258. 
 195. Id. at 266. 
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the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land”.196 
As a result, a plaintiff may have an actionable claim for aerial 
trespass when the aircraft is flying at a particularly low altitude. As 
seen in Causby, where large military planes flew well below normal 
altitude for this type of aircraft and caused frequent disruption to the 
livestock, the landowner suffered a taking for which he was entitled 
to compensation.197 
In the years since Causby, many states, either through statute or 
court decisions, have protected aircraft from liability for trespass 
unless the aircraft “interferes substantially” with the landowner’s use 
of the property.198 In addition, some cases have gone further, holding 
that mere interference with bare use or possession is not enough.199 
For a landowner to recover in an action for trespass against an 
aircraft, the landowner must show substantial interference with his 
actual use of the land, even in cases where the aircraft were flying 
below federally-regulated altitudes.200 
The types of drones populating our skies today, whether for 
recreational or commercial use, frequently fly below 500 feet. 201 
Depending on their intended use, they will generally operate between 
50 and 500 feet above ground.202 Typically they weigh less than five 
																																																																																																																																
 196. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264. 
 197. Id. at 267. 
 198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also Gardner v. County of 
Allegheny, 114 A.2d 491, 499 (Pa. 1955) (“Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this 
Commonwealth is lawful, unless at such low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which 
the land or water, or the space over the land or water, is put by the owner . . . .” (quoting Pennsylvania 
Aeronautical Code of 1933, § 402)); Anderson v. Souza, 243 P.2d 497, 505 (Cal. 1952) (“Flight in 
aircraft over the lands and waters of this State is lawful, unless at altitudes below those prescribed by 
federal authority, or unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully 
on the land or water beneath.” (quoting California Aeronautics Commission Act of 1947, § 2(d))). 
 199. Smart v. City of Los Angeles, 112 Cal. App. 3d 232, 237 (1980) (finding that the noise of 
overhead aircraft did not interfere with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment until he attempted to sell the land); 
Drennen v. County of Ventura, 38 Cal. App. 3d 84, 87–88 (1974) (declining to find trespass where the 
plaintiff did not actually use the land during the time that aircraft was flying over the property); Pueblo 
of Sandia ex rel. Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1046 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding no substantial 
interference took place because the plaintiff’s land was uninhabited and put to no use whatsoever). 
 200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Cases since Causby have 
“limited the trespass liability to instances where, even though there is a flight below the prescribed 
minimum altitude, there is no trespass unless there is such interference with actual, as distinguished 
from potential, use.” Id. § 159 cmt. k. 
 201. See Whitlock, supra note 158. 
 202. See id. 
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pounds and are relatively quiet compared to planes and helicopters.203 
Instances of low-flying drones over and around private property are 
not uncommon, nor are instances of drones disturbing property 
owners by their presence. In Leawood, Kansas, a man called police 
after seeing a neighbor’s drone flying just outside his teenage 
daughter’s bedroom window.204 In a high-rise apartment building in 
downtown Miami, a woman saw a drone peering in through her 
living room window while breastfeeding her son.205 According to 
reports, the drone was so close to the window she was almost able to 
“swat” it from her balcony. 206  In Seattle, a woman saw a drone 
hovering outside her window on the twenty-sixth floor while she was 
getting dressed. 207  Journalists at a local newspaper in Brooklyn 
spotted a drone hovering outside their office window on the thirtieth 
floor with its camera pointing at them. 208  Police investigation 
revealed that the drone was operated by an architect who claimed to 
be surveilling the property for potential development. 209  He was 
served a criminal summons for illegally flying a drone in a prohibited 
area. 210  In upstate New York, David Beesmer was charged with 
attempted unlawful surveillance and later acquitted for flying his 
drone around the windows of a medical facility where patients and 
staff became alarmed and called police.211 
These instances raise questions about who owns the rights to 
airspace just outside the confines of one’s dwelling. One way to think 
about airspace rights drawing upon property law and Fourth 
																																																																																																																																
 203. See Farber, supra note 78, at 225. Many of the best-selling drones on the market weigh less than 
one pound, have a flight duration up to twenty-two minutes and can fly approximately twenty-nine miles 
per hour. Kenney, supra note 84. 
 204. Leawood Man Says Peeping Tom Flew Drone next to Teen Daughter’s Window, supra note 16. 
 205. Carey Codd, Brickell Key Woman Says Drone Spied on Her as She Breastfed, CBS MIAMI (May 
20, 2015, 11:00 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2015/05/20/brickell-key-woman-says-drone-spied-on-
her-as-she-breastfed/. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Christina Sterbenz, Should We Freak Out About Drones Looking in Our Windows?, BUS. 
INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2014, 2:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/privacy-issues-with-commercial-
drones-2014-9. 
 208. Claude Scales, Drones Spotted Outside Eagle Offices, BROOKLYN HEIGHTS BLOG (Aug. 15, 
2015, 11:33 PM), http://brooklynheightsblog.com/archives/76132. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Zangla, supra note 37. 
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Amendment jurisprudence is that low altitude airspace immediately 
above one’s land should be treated much the same as the curtilage 
around one’s home. 212  In this way, a landowner would have 
enforceable rights to refuse entry to anyone within this vertical 
curtilage.213 Although devoid of this terminology, the Restatement 
Second of Torts adopts this principle.214 Comment l explains that 
flights fifty feet above one’s property substantially interfere with a 
landowner’s use and enjoyment of his property thus constituting an 
aerial trespass.215 
The application of the aerial trespass doctrine becomes less clear 
when an object is flying at an altitude greater than fifty feet.216 The 
further the distance between the flying object and the land the more 
difficult it will be for a plaintiff to prove that the aircraft was within 
the “immediate reaches of the land.”217  In Causby, there was no 
dispute that planes flying just eighty-three feet above plaintiff’s 
property were within the immediate reaches of his land and 
substantially interfering with his use of the property.218 Large aircraft 
flying at such a low altitude except for takeoff and landing is out of 
the ordinary.219 But according to the Restatement, distances greater 
than fifty feet are less certain to be construed as within the immediate 
reaches of one’s property.220 It is well settled that 500 feet above the 
																																																																																																																																
 212. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1986). Curtilage is the property immediately 
adjacent to one’s dwelling, including physical structures and land immediately associated with the use 
of the dwelling. Id. The curtilage of one’s home is afforded the same protections and property rights as 
the home itself, including the right to exclude others. Id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 215. Id.; see Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 87–88 (1962) (noting that flights 30 to 300 
feet above petitioner’s residence interfered with daily activities); Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United 
States, 181 F. Supp. 658, 660 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Herring v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 769, 771 (Ct. Cl. 
1958) (holding a flight at 45 feet above a residence interferes with the owner’s use and enjoyment of his 
property); see also Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 547 A.2d 387, 391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (finding 
police helicopter flying 50 feet above curtilage of defendant’s property was in non-navigable airspace 
and overly intrusive). 
 216. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 159 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 217. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 266; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
1979). 
 218. Causby, 328 U.S. at 263–64. 
 219. Id. at 264. 
 220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. l (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
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surface of the ground is considered public or navigable airspace.221 
For aircraft operating in this nebulous airspace between 50 and 500 
feet, the determination as to whether the aircraft is within the 
immediate reaches of the property will turn on how much 
interference the aircraft is actually causing to the use of the land.222 
Unlike the chickens’ suicidal reaction to the loud noise and 
significant winds caused by large planes flying low to the ground, 
drones do not pose the same physical annoyances and hazards.223 
Drones are comparably quiet, small, and relatively undetectable.224 
To be sure, the loudest objection being voiced about drones flying 
over private property is a perceived intrusion into one’s privacy.225 
The ability of the drone to use its surveillance gear to record and 
capture intimate details of people’s lives is of more concern than the 
loud noises, smells, or other intrusions and annoyances caused by 
manned aircraft. 226  Assessing the gravity of the harm caused by 
drones will require a different set of considerations and factors to 
determine if a one-pound drone hovering 150 feet over someone’s 
backyard will constitute an aerial trespass. 
Finally, the situation is even less advantageous to the landowner 
when the aircraft is flying at elevations 500 feet and higher above 
ground.227 Courts and federal regulators have historically declared an 
altitude of 500 feet or higher to be navigable airspace.228 The law is 
																																																																																																																																
 221. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989). 
 222. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 266. 
 223. Id. at 259. 
 224. Farber, supra note 78, at 225. 
 225. MARI SAKIYAMA ET AL., NEVADA VS. U.S. RESIDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD SURVEILLANCE 
USING AERIAL DRONES 3 (2014), https://www.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/page_files/27/ 
NevadaU.S.Residents’Attitudes.pdf. A 2014 study by researchers at the University of Las Vegas, 
Nevada Center for Crime and Justice Policy conducted an on-line survey of 534 adults in the U.S. and 
their perceptions and attitudes toward unmanned aerial vehicles. Id. The results showed that 88% of 
U.S. adults viewed drone use as an invasion of personal privacy. Id. This far surpassed the concerns 
expressed about public and personal safety. Id. 
 226. See id. 
 227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. at 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 228. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989); see also Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and 
Damages, supra note 17, at 3. The most significant issue in this lawsuit deals with whether Boggs’ 
drone flying at two hundred feet is within the immediate reaches of Merideth’s property or whether the 
airspace at that altitude is considered navigable airspace controlled by the FAA. See id. If the drone was 
flying in navigable airspace than Merideth had no right to shoot it down because the drone was not 
intruding on his property. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946). 
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well settled that if the aircraft is in navigable airspace it is solidly 
within the jurisdiction of the FAA and landowners have no 
possessory rights to this airspace.229 Courts have treated navigable 
airspace as public thoroughfares just the same as roads and 
highways.230 In other words, if those flying in navigable airspace 
make observations of anything on the ground they are doing so from 
a public vantage point.231 Information obtained from a lawful vantage 
point, such as public airspace, does not unreasonably intrude upon 
one’s expectation of privacy. 232  This is precisely why law 
enforcement does not need a warrant to fly 500 feet above someone’s 
property and commercial aircraft do not need permission from 
landowners to fly 500 feet above their property.233 
But drones are not dependent on close proximity to their target for 
surveillance purposes.234 A drone can hover and fly hundreds of feet 
in the sky and still capture and record images of people and places on 
the ground.235 A drone simply acts as the platform enabling the visual 
surveillance.236 The sensory enhancing instruments equipped to the 
drone determine the quality and reach of the data that can be 
collected.237 A drone is capable of hovering over an area long enough 
to allow the instruments to capture and disseminate information to 
the ground control unit. 238  Drones all but eviscerate the physical 
proximity issue due to their capabilities and on board instruments. 
																																																																																																																																
 229. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012) (“The United States government has exclusive sovereignty of 
airspace of the United States.”). According to 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1), Congress delegated the ability to 
define navigable airspace to the FAA. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1). 
 230. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 451 (1989) (finding that a police helicopter flying at 400 feet over private 
property was in navigable airspace when officers made observations of cultivation of marijuana 
occurring in backyard). Even still, the line between non-navigable airspace and navigable airspace is not 
a definite one. Federal regulators have made navigable airspace contingent on location. See 14 C.F.R. 
§ 91.119(a)-(c) (2010). 
 231. See id. at 451. 
 232. Id. at 451–52; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United 
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); see also Farber, Eyes in the Sky, supra note 102, at 19. 
 233. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451–52; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14; Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 239. 
 234. See Farber, supra note 78, at 225; see also Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 33, at 30. 
Froomkin and Colangelo suggest that the intrusions that stem from the use of the sensory enhancing 
devices are themselves the damages regardless of whether or not a technical intrusion is found. Id. 
 235. See Farber, supra note 78, at 225, 228–29. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See id; see generally Blitz et al., supra note 7, at 54–55. 
 238. See id. 
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Technologies such as wi-fi sniffers, license plates readers, night 
vision cameras, facial recognition technology and other biometric 
devices, and high-powered telephoto lenses make distance a fairly 
blunt obstacle to the collection of information.239 Indeed, a cause of 
action that is dependent on proximity to real property is of little or no 
utility in the drone context.240 
One approach to giving more force and effect to the trespass 
doctrine is for states to grant landowners a possessory right to 
airspace above their property.241 Until recently, airspace below 500 
feet has been left largely to the states to govern. 242  A state or 
municipality can grant landowners a possessory interest in the 
airspace above their property up to navigable airspace.243 In effect, 
states would be legislatively assigning a column of airspace to every 
landowner. This approach would clarify a landowner’s airspace 
rights and simplify the determination of whether an aerial trespass 
has been committed. Presumably, the legislative intent of prescribing 
a specific altitude would be prima facie evidence that unauthorized 
flight within that airspace constitutes interference with the use and 
																																																																																																																																
 239. See Alan Boyle, Night-Vision Drones Are Coming from DJI and FLIR—But Don’t Try This at 
Home, GEEKWIRE (Dec. 11, 2015, 10:40 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2015/night-vision-drones-
coming-dji-flir-dont-try-home/ (night vision); A. Barton Hinkle, How Police Drones and License-Plate 
Readers Threaten Liberty, REASON (Apr. 15, 2015), http://reason.com/archives/2015/04/15/how-
police-drones-and-license-plate-read (license-plate readers); Jason Koebler, This Drone Zoom Lens Can 
Identify Your Face from 1,000 Feet Away, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 25, 2015, 3:39 PM), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/this-drone-zoom-lens-can-identify-your-face-from-1000-feet-away 
(telephoto lens); Barry Levine, Drones Overhead in L.A.’s Valley Are Tracking Mobile Devices’ 
Locations, VENTUREBEAT (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:11 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2015/02/23/drones-over-
head-in-las-valley-are-tracking-mobile-devices-locations/ (wi-fi sniffing); Madison Ruppert, Nowhere to 
Run: Drones, Facial Recognition, Soft Biometrics and Threat Assessments, ACTIVIST POST (Sept. 30, 
2011), http://www.activistpost.com/2011/09/nowhere-to-run-drones-facial.html (facial recognition 
technology). 
 240. A property owner may have an actionable claim against a drone operator in instances where a 
drone flies within fifty feet of a house, but the same drone flying autonomously at a higher altitude can 
see through windows and skylights and listen in on wi-fi signals. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 159 cmt. l (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“[F]light within 50 feet, which interferes with actual use, 
clearly is, and flight within 150 feet, which also so interferes, may present a question of fact.”). 
 241. See Rule, supra note 26, at 187. Rule recommends legislation to define these rights all the way 
up to the 500-foot navigable airspace line. Id. 
 242. See Michael Hiltzik, California Struggles to Lead the Way on Drone Regulation, L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 5, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-drones-20160807-snap-
story.html. 
 243. See Rule, supra note 26, at 187, 202–03. 
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enjoyment of one’s land. All a landowner would need to show to 
establish a claim of aerial trespass would be that the drone flew in to 
the owner’s airspace without permission.244 
Indeed, this is precisely the approach Oregon and Nevada have 
taken, passing laws designed specifically to restrict operation of low 
flying drones over private property.245 In June 2015, Nevada’s law 
took effect, which allows a landowner to bring an action in trespass 
against the owner or operator of an unmanned aerial vehicle that is 
flown fewer than 250 feet over the landowner’s property without 
permission.246 This newly minted statute, in effect, creates a defined 
column of airspace for every landowner who has the authority, 
notwithstanding the statute’s exceptions, to refuse entry into this 
designated airspace above his property.247 
																																																																																																																																
 244. Id. at 187. 
 245. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 837.380(4)–(6) (2016); Assemb. B. 239 § 18.5(a), §§ 19.1(a)–(b), 78th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015). 
 246. Assemb. B. 239, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015). 
 247. Subsection 1 of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 493.103 creates the property right. It reads as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, a person who owns or lawfully 
occupies real property in this State may bring an action for trespass against the 
owner or operator of an unmanned aerial vehicle that is flown at a height of less 
than 250 feet over the property if: (a) the owner or operator of the unmanned 
aerial vehicle has flown the unmanned aerial vehicle over the property at a height 
of less than 250 feet on at least one previous occasion; and (b) the person who 
owns or occupies the real property notified the owner or operator of the 
unmanned aerial vehicle that the person did not authorize the flight of the 
unmanned aerial vehicle over the property at a height of less than 250 feet. For 
the purposes of this paragraph, a person may place the owner or operator of an 
unmanned aerial vehicle on notice in the manner prescribed in subsection 2 of 
NRS 207.200. 
 
Subsection 2 lists the exceptions: 
A person may not bring an action pursuant to subsection 1 if: (a) the unmanned 
aerial vehicle is lawfully in the flight path for landing at an airport, airfield or 
runway; (b) the unmanned aerial vehicle is in the process of taking off or landing; 
(c) the unmanned aerial vehicle was under the lawful operation of: (1) a law 
enforcement agency in accordance with section 20 of this act; and (2) a public 
agency in accordance with section 21 of this act; or (d) The unmanned aerial 
vehicle was under the lawful operation of a business licensed in this State or a 
land surveyor if: (1) the operator is licensed or otherwise approved to operate the 
unmanned aerial vehicle by the Federal Aviation Administration; (2) the 
unmanned aerial vehicle is being operated within the scope of the lawful activities 
of the business or surveyor; and (3) the operation of the unmanned aerial vehicle 
does not unreasonably interfere with the existing use of the real property. 
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The difficulty with states granting airspace rights to landowners, as 
in the cases of Nevada and Oregon, is that the FAA has the authority 
to regulate aircraft at any altitude.248 Since the beginning of modern 
aviation, the FAA has generally left the ability to control the airspace 
up to 500 feet—the minimum altitude for safe air travel because 
manned aircraft did not use low elevation airspace except for takeoff 
and landing—to the states.249 But with the proliferation of drones and 
the pressure on the FAA to integrate drones into our national 
airspace, the FAA has extended its jurisdiction below 500 feet for the 
purpose of regulating the safe operation of unmanned aircraft.250 The 
new rules for small commercial drones are designed to ensure safety, 
rather than to protect privacy.251 In fact, the FAA plainly stated that 
its mission is “to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system 
in the world, and does not include regulating privacy.”252 This is 
good news for the hundreds of cities and towns banning drones and 
the thirty-one states that recently passed statutes to protect residents 
from snooping drones.253 The FAA recognizes that while it is the sole 
authority when it comes to ensuring safety in our skies, state and 
																																																																																																																																
Additionally, subsection 3 allows a plaintiff who prevails in an action for trespass brought pursuant to 
subsection 1 to recover triple damages for any injury to person or property, as well as reasonable 
attorney’s fees and court costs. The plaintiff can also be awarded injunctive relief. Id.Georgia has 
proposed a similar approach in its pending legislation for civil cause of action for trespass by unmanned 
aircraft, except that it has designated 100 feet above ground as the marker. H.B. 157th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). 
 248. Busting Myths about the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, FAA (Feb. 26, 2015), 
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76240; see also Mark J. Connot & Jason J. Zummo, 
Navigable Airspace: Where Private Property Rights End and Navigable Airspace Begins, FOX 
ROTHSCHILD LLP (Jan. 15, 2016), https://ontheradar.foxrothschild.com/2016/01/articles/auvsi/ 
navigable-airspace-where-private-property-rights-end-and-navigable-airspace-begins/. 
 249. See Hiltzik, supra note 242. 
 250. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 
42,066 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, et al.). 
 251. See id. 
 252. Safety: The Foundation of Everything We Do, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/about/safety_efficiency/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (“[O]ur mission [is] to provide 
the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.”); Operation and Certification of Small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,191 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. 
pts. 21, 43, 61, et al.) (“[T]he FAA’s rulemaking authority neither mandates nor permits the FAA to 
issue or enforce regulations specifically aimed at protecting privacy interests between third parties.”). 
 253. See Christopher Burns, FAA to States, Cities: Back Away from the Drone (Regulations), 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 2, 2016, 8:12 AM), http://bangordailynews.com/2016/01/02/the-point/faa-
to-states-cities-back-away-from-the-drone-regulations/. 
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local governments have taken steps to bolster privacy protections 
from unwanted aerial observers. 254  The FAA does not seek to 
preempt state and local privacy laws, as those interests fall outside 
the agency’s mandate. 255  Hence, after much speculation and 
consternation among lawmakers, the FAA did not include a 
preemption clause in its final rules pertaining to small commercial 
UAS.256 
B. Nuisance 
The tort of nuisance may be better suited to address overhead 
flight at any altitude because nuisance actions are not dependent on 
an intrusion of one’s possessory interest in real property. Simply put, 
conduct that interferes with the use and enjoyment of the land is 
actionable under a nuisance theory. 257  There are two types of 
nuisance, private and public. 258  A private nuisance requires the 
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of one’s 
land.259 A public nuisance requires that the harm be greater than to 
one individual, rather it must constitute a “public harm,” an activity 
																																																																																																																																
 254. See ESSEX, supra note 7, at 10. 
 255. See id. at 13; see also Kang, supra note 21 (“The new F.A.A. rules do not necessarily preclude a 
hodgepodge of state and local drone regulations that have popped up in recent years. The administration 
sent a letter to states and cities saying they recommend everyone follow their lead. But it is only a 
recommendation.”). 
 256. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 
42,066 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, et al.). Until the FAA’s issuance of 
its final rules on June 21, 2016, there was great concern among state and local lawmakers regarding 
whether the thirty-one states with laws aimed at restricting drone use to protect privacy would be 
preempted by the agency’s intent to control the field. See Cecilia Kang, F.A.A. Drone Laws Start to 
Clash with Stricter Local Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/technology/faa-drone-laws-start-to-clash-with-stricter-local-
rules.html [hereinafter Kang, F.A.A. Drone Laws]. Had the federal agency’s jurisdiction extended that 
broadly, it would have had a crippling effect on laws like the one recently passed in Nevada. See 
Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,066 (June 
28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, et al.). A drone operator being sued could 
successfully argue that he was operating in public airspace as evidenced by the FAA’s exclusive 
jurisdiction of the contested airspace. See Kang, F.A.A. Drone Laws, supra. Essentially, any claim of 
trespass would be nullified unless the drone touched down on the land of the plaintiff. Many of these 
laws go further than the FAA regulations, specifically imposing fines and criminal violations for lack of 
compliance. ESSEX, supra note 7, at 23–25. 
 257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 258. Id. § 821A. 
 259. Id. § 821D. 
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that is harmful to public health or safety.260 Moreover, a plaintiff in a 
private nuisance suit need not own the property so long as he is a 
lawful occupant or user of the property.261 In either case, a plaintiff 
must prove that the interference was intentional or due to a 
defendant’s negligence.262 Nuisance claims often involve instances 
where the defendant’s conduct creates a condition such as a noise, 
vibration, odor, or light that unreasonably interferes with the 
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his land.263 Disturbance of peace of 
mind is also actionable.264 There could be overlap between nuisance 
and trespass; where an object both invades the property and interferes 
with the use and enjoyment of land.265 In nuisance cases, courts tend 
																																																																																																																																
 260. Id. § 821B. 
 261. Webel v. Yale Univ., 7 A.2d 215, 219 (Conn. 1939) (“In the modern authorities it [private 
nuisance] includes all injuries to an owner or occupier in the enjoyment of the property of which he is in 
possession, without regard to the quality of the tenure.” (citing FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, 
JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 179 (3rd ed. 2009))); FREDERICK SIR 
POLLOCK, POLLACK’S LAW OF TORTS § 422 (13th ed. 1939); W. T. S. STALLYBRASS, SALMOND ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 235 Torts (8th ed. 1936). 
 262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 263. See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1952) (finding that 
vibration and noise from plant greatly disturbed plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their homes); Holmberg v. 
Bergin, 172 N.W.2d 739, 744 (Minn. 1969) (finding that tree roots from neighbor’s tree growing under 
sidewalk and creating drainage problems caused harm to plaintiff’s property); McClung v. Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co., 51 So.2d 371, 373, 375 (Ala. 1951) (finding a nuisance to residents in the 
immediate vicinity because unloading metal sand cars into bins frequently and during the early morning 
made loud noise and churned up dust). 
 264. See Puritan Holding Co. v. Holloschitz, 372 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (1975) (dilapidated building 
across street); Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 51 (1910) (sanitarium for treatment of tuberculosis); 
City of Baltimore v. Fairfield Imp. Co., 87 Md. 352, 360, 367–68 (1898) (fear of contagion from 
housing a leper on adjacent property). 
 265. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1979). The Restatement 
of Torts describes the difference with this illustration: 
Thus the flooding of the plaintiff’s land, which is a trespass, is also a nuisance if it 
is repeated or of long duration; and when the defendant’s dog howls under the 
plaintiff’s window night after night and deprives him of sleep, there is a nuisance 
whether the dog is outside the plaintiff’s land or has entered upon it, and the 
defendant’s negligence in looking after the dog would make him liable either for 
trespass if there was an entry or for nuisance whether there was entry or not. 
Id. One key difference between nuisance and trespass is in the remedy. Nuisance could lead to an 
injunction and damages, whereas trespass would typically lead to just damages. See, e.g., New Mexico 
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1243 (D.N.M. 2004) (“The equitable remedy of injunction to 
enjoin a public nuisance developed early in the history of the development of equity jurisprudence . . . .” 
(citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90 at 643 (5th ed. 
1984))); Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 288 P.2d 507, 511 (Cal. 1955) (“Once a cause of action 
for trespass or nuisance is established, an occupant of land may recover damages for annoyance and 
discomfort that would naturally ensue therefrom.” (quoting Herzog v. Grosso, 259 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 
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to focus on the diminution of usability of the land, which includes but 
is not limited to recovery for diminution of the property’s market 
value, personal discomfort to its occupants, and interference with the 
pleasure and comfort a person normally derives from their land.266 
According to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the essential element 
of an actionable nuisance is that persons have suffered harm or are 
threatened with injuries that they ought not have to bear.267 
Under the tort of nuisance, a plaintiff must prove that the harm was 
not only substantial but unreasonable. 268  Neighborhood 
characteristics and customs are factors in determining whether a 
defendant’s conduct constitutes unreasonable and substantial harm.269 
For instance, the ringing of church bells and the fragrance of baking 
bread are not likely to be found unreasonable.270 On the other hand, 
activities that are out of character with the neighborhood, such as 
loudly unloading metal sand cars into bins frequently and during the 
early morning, will constitute a nuisance.271 At common law, it is 
widely held that noises or vibrations that interfere with one’s ability 
to use or enjoy one’s property constitute private nuisances.272 
Courts also look to the frequency, magnitude, and duration when 
assessing reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct. 273  Occasional 
invasions may not constitute unreasonable interference whereas 
continuous, repeated, and frequent activities may.274 Potential harm 
to the plaintiff caused by a defendant’s activity, as well as harm to 
adjoining property owners and inhabitants, is relevant to a finding of 
																																																																																																																																
1953))). 
 266. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1979). The interference must be 
one that a normal person would find offensive. See id. If the inference is only harmful to especially 
sensitive persons than courts are unlikely to find interference actionable. See id. 
 267. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1247 (R.I. 1982) (“[L]iability in nuisance is predicated upon 
unreasonable injury rather than unreasonable conduct.”). 
 268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 269. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS § 401 (2nd ed. 
Supp. 2016). 
 270. Id. 
 271. E.g., McClung v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 51 So. 2d 371, 373 (Ala. 1951). 
 272. E.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1952). 
 273. See DOBBS, supra note 269. 
 274. Id. 
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nuisance.275 The utility of a defendant’s conduct is certainly relevant 
to a nuisance assessment.276 A defendant’s activity could have high 
social value to the community but constitute a nuisance if it is 
outweighed by the gravity of the harm caused to the plaintiff.277 On 
the other hand, where a defendant’s conduct bears no utility for the 
greater good and poses tangible risks to the public, it will likely count 
as a nuisance.278 
Consider a situation where an operator flies his drone over another 
person’s home and records the activities of the occupants on their 
property—perhaps sunbathing or enjoying a family meal. 
Alternatively, the drone flies around the dwelling with its 
high-resolution camera peering into windows. The homeowner may 
be able to make out a prima facie case for nuisance by demonstrating 
that the drone’s presence is preventing him from enjoying the 
premises or going near the windows for fear of being recorded.279 
Quite likely, the homeowner’s response would be deemed 
reasonable.280 But other considerations will come into play, such as 
the frequency and duration of these over-flights, the time of day and 
the altitude of the drone flights, if the operator is recording people 
and events on the ground, how densely populated the neighborhood, 
and if there are other means of viewing the space inside and around 
the home that compromise the privacy of the homeowner regardless 
of the drone’s presence.281 
The presence of drones in the sky is a relatively new phenomenon, 
distinct from conduct courts have traditionally deemed a nuisance.282 
As drones populate our sky more people will look for relief from 
existing tort law. Where these laws fall short of providing redress, 
public pressure will mount to reform such laws or create new ones. 
																																																																																																																																
 275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 276. Id. at § 828. 
 277. See id. at § 827. 
 278. See id. 
 279. See id. at § 822. 
 280. See id. If the drone is operating in compliance with federal regulations and local laws, such 
evidence will weigh against plaintiff’s claim that the interference is unreasonable. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 281. Id. at §§ 827–828. 
 282. See id. at § 821D. 
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C. Privacy Torts 
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis first gave voice to legal 
notions of invasion of privacy in their groundbreaking article The 
Right to Privacy.283 In this turn-of-the-century masterpiece, Warren 
and Brandeis characterized privacy as “the right to be let alone,” and 
they identified technology as one of the major threats to privacy.284 
More than half a century later, William Prosser categorized privacy 
torts into four separate causes of action.285 These four torts were later 
adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.286 
The privacy torts that are most relevant to unmanned aerial 
surveillance are intrusion upon seclusion and the public disclosure of 
private facts.287 Intrusion upon seclusion focuses on the collection of 
personal information. 288  The tort has two key elements: (1) an 
intentional intrusion on the plaintiff’s solitude, seclusion, or private 
affairs, and (2) that the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.289 To permit recovery, some states require that the 
intrusion cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation.290 Privacy 
intrusions that give rise to tortious liability seek to vindicate the 
freedom to act in one’s home or other private place without 
observation.291 
Intrusion upon seclusion has some limiting principles. First, the 
intrusion must have been intentional, meaning the defendant must 
have desired that the intrusion occur or must have known with a 
substantial certainty that an intrusion would result from his 
																																																																																																																																
 283. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 284. Id. at 193, 195 (“[N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what 
is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”). 
 285. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL L. REV. 381, 389 (1960). 
 286. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B-E (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 287. See Villasenor, supra note 102 at 500–05. 
 288. See Benjamin Zhu, A Traditional Tort for a Modern Threat: Applying Intrusion upon Seclusion 
to Dataveillance Observations, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2381, 2395 (2014). 
 289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 290. See, e.g., DeAngelo v. Fortney, 515 A.2d 594, 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding defendant’s 
conduct of filling out solicitation cards with plaintiff’s name on them, causing companies to solicit 
plaintiff via telephone and mail two times, did not amount to a “substantial and highly offensive” 
intrusion). 
 291. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 647 (Cal. 1994). 
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conduct. 292  Thus, an accidental or innocent intrusion is not 
actionable.293 Second, there is no tortious conduct if the defendant 
did not intrude into a legally-cognizable private place or sphere 
belonging to the plaintiff.294 Observing a person in a public place or 
taking a photograph of a person who can be viewed from a public 
vantage point is generally not considered an invasion of privacy.295 
Intrusions upon seclusion are often determined by whether the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time and in 
the place of the alleged intrusion.296 Individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in shielded areas where they have ownership 
or control over the property, such as the home and its curtilage,297 or 
in locations dealing with intimate details of one’s health, such as 
hospitals or ambulances. 298  The intrusion does not have to be 
physical and can occur through the use of the “defendant’s senses, 
with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s 
private affairs.” 299  As illustrated by the Restatement, a private 
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 296. See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, 306 F.3d 806, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
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Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that an intrusion upon seclusion claim 
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 297. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1417 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979); see also 
Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (television producer and camera 
crew entered home without permission to film unsuccessful efforts of paramedics to save the life of 
plaintiff’s husband who had suffered heart attack); Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 
271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (private investigator entered hospital room to interrogate patient). 
 299. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1979). 
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detective using binoculars to peer into a person’s bedroom window 
and take pictures violates that individual’s expectation of privacy.300 
In Wolfson v. Lewis, a television crew surveilled the home of a 
healthcare executive for several hours using both high-powered 
cameras and microphones.301 In doing so, the defendants were able to 
see inside the home as well as hear conversations happening 
inside. 302  Despite the fact that the defendants did not enter the 
plaintiffs’ premises, the court found the defendants intruded upon the 
plaintiffs’ seclusion and solitude. 303  In contrast, broadcasting a 
picture of a residence which shows only what can be observed from a 
public vantage point is not an invasion of privacy.304 
The third limitation is that there is no liability unless the 
interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion is substantial enough to 
offend a person of “ordinary sensibilities.”305 Courts interpreting this 
standard have required the intrusion be highly offensive, 306 
repugnant,307 or “outrageously unreasonable conduct.”308 Usually, a 
single incident will not suffice; rather, the intrusions must be 
																																																																																																																																
 300. Id. § 652B cmt. b, illus. 2. 
 301. Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1428. 
 302. Id. at 1428–30. 
 303. Id. at 1432. 
A reasonable jury could well find that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lewis intentionally 
intruded, in a manner that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, upon 
the solitude and seclusion of the Wolfsons by engaging in a course of conduct 
apparently designed to hound, harass, intimidate and frighten them. The 
intrusions committed by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lewis consisted of a pattern of 
conduct involving physical and sensory invasions into Mr. and Mrs. Wolfson’s 
privacy. Mr. Wilson’s and Mr. Lewis’s actions deprived the Wolfsons of the right 
to live their life quietly and peacefully. 
Id. 
 304. See Wehling v. CBS, 721 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding broadcasting a picture of a 
plaintiff’s residence which showed nothing more than what could be seen from a public street is not an 
invasion of privacy). 
 305. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also Shorter 
v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329, 331 (D.S.C. 1966) (“[T]he acts complained of must be so gross 
and out of line as to offend one of ordinary sensibilities.”). 
 306. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 307. Fabio v. Credit Bureau of Hutchinson, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 688, 692 (D. Minn. 2002). 
 308. Noble Oil Co., v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729, 733 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1984). However, courts have also 
recognized cases where a single intrusion was sufficient given the nature of the activities filmed or the 
overzealous nature of surveillance itself. See, e.g., Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (finding a single instance of videotaping a man having a seizure in his bedroom 
constitutes “highly offensive conduct”). 
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“repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a 
course of hounding of the plaintiff, that becomes a substantial burden 
to his existence.” 309  Courts will consider circumstances including 
“the degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances 
surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and 
objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of 
those whose privacy is invaded.”310 Likewise, if a plaintiff was not 
acting in a manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy, a 
defendant’s conduct will rarely justify liability. 311  Plaintiff’s 
expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable.312 Normative 
assessments of private expectations are informed by shared norms 
and social values.313 Judicial determinations about what constitutes 
reasonable expectations of privacy change over time and are 
significantly impacted by technology.314 
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 310. Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 679. 
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 313. See e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120–21 (2006) (“customary social understanding” 
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of a privacy tort and society’s expectations: 
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Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 
CALIF. L. REV. 957, 1008–09 (1989). 
 314. See e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (U.S. 2014) (invalidating a warrantless search 
of a smartphone relying in part on the fact that a vast majority of Americans own smartphones in which 
they store their “privacies of life”); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403, 431 (2012) (unanimously 
holding that warrantless police tracking of the defendant for twenty-eight days using a global 
positioning system constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
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Courts have consistently found no tortious conduct when 
observing or taking a photograph of an individual when his or her 
“appearance is public and open to the public eye.”315 In Fogel v. 
Forbes, Inc., the plaintiffs claimed that their privacy was invaded 
when their picture was taken and included in an issue of Forbes 
Magazine without their consent.316 However, because the photograph 
was taken at the Miami Airport, a place open to the general public, 
the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim due to the lack of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place they were recorded.317 
Similarly in Jackson v. Playboy, plaintiffs could not claim intrusion 
of privacy when an image of them standing on a city sidewalk was 
taken.318 In Shulman v. Group W Productions, a cameraman filmed 
plaintiffs’ extrication from a car following a crash.319 Finding no 
liability, the court explained that the plaintiffs had no control over the 
premises and could not have reasonably expected members of the 
media would be prevented from covering a highway accident.320 
Even plaintiffs who were surveilled while on their own property 
have generally been unsuccessful under an intrusion theory if they 
could be viewed from a public or adjacent vantage point.321 In GTE 
Mobilnet v. Pascouet, the plaintiffs alleged an intrusion into their 
privacy when GTE workers on a neighboring plot looked out over the 
plaintiffs’ fence and into their backyard.322 The court held that the 
																																																																																																																																
27, 40 (2001) (holding the use of a thermal imaging device not available to general public constituted a 
search). 
 315. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1979); see also Wehling v. 
CBS, 721 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983); Dempsey v. Natl’l Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 927, 931 (D. Me. 
1988). 
 316. Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
 317. Id. at 1087. 
 318. Jackson v. Playboy Enters., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
 319. Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d. 469, 474 (Cal. 1998). 
 320. Id. at 477. The court, however, held that a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiffs had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy within the helicopter because the helicopter served as an ambulance, 
which is inherently private, and it is not customary for the media to film the medical treatment of a 
stranger. Id. at 490–91 (“Certainly, if there is any right of privacy at all, it should include the right to 
obtain medical treatment at home or in a hospital . . . without personal publicity.” (quoting Barber v. 
Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942))). 
 321. McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 347 (Or. 1975); GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. Ltd. 
P’Ship v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599, 618 (Tex. App. 2001). 
 322. GTE Mobilnet, 61 S.W.3d at 606. 
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mere fact that maintenance workers looked over into the adjoining 
yard was insufficient in proving “highly offensive” conduct.323 In 
McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendants intruded upon his privacy when they filmed the plaintiff 
from neighboring property and saw him mowing the lawn and 
gardening.324 The court held that the surveillance did not intrude on 
the plaintiff’s privacy because his activities could have been 
observed by neighbors or passersby, and the surveillance was neither 
unreasonable nor unobtrusive.325 Similarly, in Florida v. Riley, the 
United States Supreme Court concluded that the defendant did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy pertaining to activity in his 
backyard that was open and visible from a police helicopter flying 
400 feet above his property.326 
There are limited circumstances where, even in a public place, 
information about a person, if accidentally exposed, should not be 
photographed or recorded.327 In Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, a 
plaintiff claimed the defendant intruded into her privacy when it 
published a photograph of her dress blown up as she was leaving a 
fun house at a county fair. 328  The court held that it would be 
“illogical, wrong, and unjust” for an individual caught in an 
embarrassing image to forfeit her right to privacy merely because she 
was in a public place.329 Therefore, “where one’s status is changed 
without [her] volition to a status embarrassing to an ordinary person,” 
she has a right to be protected from intrusion of privacy.330 Likewise, 
in Huskey v. NBC, a prisoner claimed that the NBC television 
company intruded into his privacy when they filmed him without his 
consent from inside the prison.331 NBC countered that the plaintiff 
was visible to the public eye and had no reasonable expectation of 
																																																																																																																																
 323. Id. at 618. 
 324. McLain, 533 P.2d at 345. 
 325. Id. at 346 (“If the surveillance is conducted in a reasonable and unobtrusive manner, the 
defendant will incur no liability for invasion of privacy.”). 
 326. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989). 
 327. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c, illus. 7 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979). 
 328. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 475–76 (Ala. 1964). 
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 331. Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
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privacy because he could be seen by guards and other inmates.332 The 
court allowed the plaintiff’s intrusion claim to go forward, noting that 
the mere fact that a person can be seen by others does not mean that 
the person cannot be legally “secluded.” 333  Nonetheless, as the 
majority of cases make clear, liability seems to be an exception as the 
law favors less restriction in public places. 
Given the capabilities of drones, it is relatively easy for operators 
to capture images inside and outside of one’s home without 
physically trespassing on to one’s property.334 If there is proof of 
intent, then a drone capturing images inside one’s home may give 
rise to liability assuming that the target of the surveillance was not in 
public view or visible from adjacent property.335 On the other hand, 
the tort may offer no relief if the drone flies over someone’s fenced-
in backyard and records him.336 Unsurprisingly, of the few surveys 
measuring public attitudes towards drones, there is mounting 
discomfort with drones flying over private property.337 Legislators 
are responding to public concern, but it will take time before the law 
recognizes a privacy expectation when it comes to aerial surveillance. 
Until then, individuals will receive little legal recourse from 
unmanned aerial surveillance under a theory of intrusion upon 
seclusion. 
A second theory of liability for drone operators under the umbrella 
of the privacy torts is the public disclosure of private facts.338 It is 
conceivable that drone operators who capture images or gather 
information regarding matters of private concern could be held liable 
for disseminating this information to third parties through social 
																																																																																																																																
 332. Id. at 1287. 
 333. Id. at 1287–88 (finding that a prisoner working out in the exercise room of a prison did not 
reasonably expect to be filmed because he could not be viewed from a public location such as a street or 
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 334. See Farber, supra note 78, at 225, 228–29. 
 335. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1419–20 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 336. See e.g., Jackson v. Playboy Enters., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 
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 337. SAKIYAMA, supra note 225, at 1. 
 338. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
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media or other means.339 A person is liable for the publication of 
private facts when she “gives publicity to a matter concerning the 
private life of another” so long as “the matter publicized is of a kind 
that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is 
not of legitimate concern to the public.”340 
“Publicity” means that the matter is communicated to the public at 
large or to “so many persons” that the matter must be regarded as 
“substantially certain” to become public knowledge. 341 
Disseminating the information by newspaper, small circulation, or 
orally to a group is sufficient to give publicity.342 Courts have held 
that postings to social media pages, despite the potential privacy or 
setting limitations of the audience, open up the information to the 
public at large.343 
The information publicized must also be private; publication is 
protected for matters already in the public domain.344 It is not enough 
that someone considers the information private. 345  To be deemed 
“private,” there must not be, or have been, records documenting the 
information as available to the public. 346  In G.D. v. Kenny, the 
plaintiff, running for political office, had a past conviction expunged 
from his record. 347  Opponents of the campaign distributed flyers 
exposing his prior conviction. 348  The court found no invasion of 
privacy when the defendant revealed the plaintiff’s criminal past 
even though the record was expunged because the matter was once 
part of the public record.349 
																																																																																																																																
 339. See id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. § 652D cmt. a; see also Cole v. Chandler, 752 A.2d 1189, 1197 (Me. 2000). 
 342. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Generally, however, 
it is not enough to communicate private facts to a single person even if that single person could pass the 
information on to other people. See Robins v. Conseco Fin. Loan Co., 656 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
 343. Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 344. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 345. See, e.g., G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 319–22 (N.J. 2010). 
 346. Id. at 320–21. 
 347. Id. at 304. 
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 349. Id. at 304, 321. 
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To establish that the matter publicized would be highly offensive 
courts look to the “context, conduct, and circumstances” 350 
surrounding the publication to evaluate whether it would make a 
reasonable person would feel “seriously aggrieved.”351 In Green v. 
Chicago Tribune Co., the defendant published an article about the 
plaintiffs’ murdered son, which contained unauthorized statements 
and photographs regarding medical treatment.352 The court held that 
due to the nature of the information and lack of authorization, a 
reasonable jury could find that the publication was highly offensive 
to a reasonable person.353 
The last element, the absence of legitimate public concern 
regarding the matter, is generally a question of newsworthiness.354 
Newsworthiness bars common law liability, since there is typically 
substantial social value regarding matters of public concern.355 When 
determining whether a matter is newsworthy, courts weigh “the 
social value of the facts published, the depth of intrusion into 
ostensibly private affairs, and the extent to which the party 
voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety.”356 Thus, nearly 
any truthful information regarding public persons or public affairs, no 
matter how serious the invasion, will likely be protected.357 However, 
this protection is not unlimited.358 It disappears when the information 
ceases to be that “to which the public is entitled, and becomes morbid 
and sensational prying into the private lives for its own sake.”359 For 
instance, in Bimbo v. Viking Press, Inc., the court held that—
regardless of its truth—a publication depicting incestuous 
relationships of the Plaintiff did not bear such societal significance as 
to render it a matter of public concern.360 
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Conceivably, a drone operator could be held liable for publication 
of private facts for recording images inside and outside of another’s 
home and disseminating the images via social media or other means 
of publication. 361  The surveillance target’s location will largely 
determine liability.362 Google’s Street View Program is a scenario 
with similar features to unmanned aerial surveillance, and has been 
tested in the courts.363 Creating the digital images accessible through 
Google’s Street View Program requires Google employees using 
panoramic cameras mounted to the tops of their vehicles to drive 
around neighborhoods taking photographs of houses and 
landmarks.364 Plaintiffs Christine and Aaron Boring sued Google on 
theories of intrusion upon seclusion and dissemination of private 
facts for photographs taken of their home and swimming pool 
viewable from their driveway.365 The Third Circuit reasoned that “no 
person of ordinary sensibilities would be shamed, humiliated, or have 
suffered mentally as a result of a vehicle entering in his or her 
ungated driveway and photographing the view from there.” 366 
Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiff’s pool and house could 
be seen by anyone who entered the driveway.367 Recording images of 
people and property from navigable airspace raises some of the same 
objections and legal precedents raised in Boring. 368  Yet the 
capabilities of drones are potentially more intrusive and nefarious 
than the technology used in the Google Street View Program. 
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 361. See THOMPSON, supra note 163, at 16. 
 362. See id. 
 363. Boring v. Google, Inc., 362 Fed. Appx. 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 364. Id. at 276. 
 365. Id. at 276, 278. 
 366. Id. at 279. 
 367. Id. (finding no valid claim for publicity given to private life where any person, including a mail 
carrier, delivery persons, or any guest, would have the same view). 
 368. THOMPSON, supra note 163, at 16. 
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V. THE BEST PATH FORWARD: PROMOTING A BURGEONING INDUSTRY 
WHILE SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY 
The Obama administration embraced drone technology as a 
“transformative technology” that has huge potential for the private 
and commercial sectors.369 President Obama also acknowledged the 
concern this technology poses to existing expectations of privacy.370 
The balance between enabling this burgeoning industry to take off 
and protecting existing privacy norms and expectations is a difficult, 
if not impossible, task. 371  There is fierce debate among scholars, 
lawmakers, regulators, and industry professionals about the best path 
forward.372 There are those who believe that individual landowners 
should have the right to exclude unwanted intruders from their 
airspace.373 There are others who advocate for laws and regulations 
to chart a national course for unmanned aircraft into our airspace.374 
As a practical matter, a patchwork of individual lawsuits is not a 
plan; it is a Band-Aid. Lawsuits brought by landowners aggrieved by 
a drone operation may provide recovery in some cases, but individual 
cases will not create a predictable path for integrating drones into our 
airspace. Laws and regulations must circumscribe how, when, and by 
whom these aerial observers can be used to create a uniform 
approach toward fostering the potential of this burgeoning industry, 
while thoughtfully preserving basic privacy interests. 
																																																																																																																																
 369. Presidential Memorandum, Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, 
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Unquestionably, drones are quickly becoming a commercial force 
all over the globe.375 When drones are able to stay aloft for hours and 
safely carry out autonomous flights, then people will rely on them for 
transportation in the same ways we currently rely on planes, trains, 
and automobiles. For that reason, Congress tasked the FAA with 
developing a plan to integrate UAS into our national airspace.376 
Alongside the FAA’s efforts for safe integration of drones into the 
national airspace, the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA), an arm of the Department of Commerce, 
devised a set of “best practices” for privacy, transparency, and 
accountability in the use of drones.377 Some of the best practices 
include: making reasonable efforts to notify individuals who will be 
impacted by the operation to collect data, avoiding operations where 
subjects have a reasonable expectation of privacy, minimizing flights 
over or within private property without consent from landowners or 
proper legal authority, and avoiding using UAS for continuous and 
persistent collection of data.378 Operators should maintain a privacy 
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policy which details the purpose for which the data will be collected, 
the kinds of data collected, the length of time data will be retained, 
and the practices for de-identification. 379  They should also make 
reasonable efforts to not share or use collected data for marketing 
purposes without prior consent.380 Many of these best practices bear 
similarity to the Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act 
introduced in Congress in 2013 and reintroduced in 2015.381 Federal 
regulators left open the opportunity for state and local governments 
to regulate drone operations as they relate to privacy and property 
rights.382 This is clear since the FAA circumscribed its rules to focus 
exclusively on safety and efficiency.383 The door is open for states 
and municipalities to set limits on when and where drones can fly, 
within the parameters already set by the FAA.384  For instance, a 
municipality could restrict the distance a drone may fly relative to 
buildings, or further limit the daytime hours in which a drone may 
operate.385 Assuming these regulations are designed to ensure privacy 
interests—and do not conflict with federal laws—state and local 
governments are entitled to regulate drones to serve their particular 
interests.386 The recommendations made by the NTIA, along with 
recent drone legislation designed to ensure privacy while promoting 
drone technology, will help to strike the right balance between 
promoting economic opportunity and safeguarding privacy interests 
in the age of drones. 
																																																																																																																																
 379. Id. at 6. 
 380. Id. 
 381. See Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 1229, 114th Cong. (2015); 
Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 1262, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 382. See Kang, supra note 21. 
 383. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,190 
(June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, et al.) (“[T]he FAA notes that its mission is 
to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world, and does not include regulating 
privacy.”) 
 384. See Kang, supra note 21. 
 385. Id. 
 386. ESSEX, supra note 7, at 13. 
2017] PRIVACY TORTS AND DRONES 409 
CONCLUSION 
The drone’s size, versatility, and maneuverability separate it from 
other aircraft and satellites. When the property laws changed to 
accommodate high altitude aircraft, such as planes and even 
helicopters, it was understood that the risks to privacy were minimal 
and the need for air travel was great. However, drones maneuver in 
low altitude airspace, thereby posing new and tangible threats to 
privacy. As people turn to the courts for relief, the thorny issues 
raised in this article about the applicability of existing torts to drones 
will have to be resolved. The shortcomings of these doctrines will 
likely pave the way for the passage of new drone laws, designed to 
settle the ambiguity about where a property owner’s rights to airspace 
begin and end. No doubt the new rules governing small commercial 
drones will exponentially increase the number of drones in our skies. 
At the same time, state and local governments have the opportunity 
to define the scope of landowners’ property interest in low altitude 
airspace, thereby balancing the interests of a burgeoning industry 
with those who wish to keep drones at a reasonable distance. 
Shortcomings in existing torts to handle drone privacy cases will 
direct future legislation. To be sure, laws that give property owners 
express rights to exclude drones from the navigable airspace directly 
above their property will ameliorate some of the deficiencies in how 
our existing torts are currently being applied to drones. 
